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ARTICLES
Recent Initiatives in International
Financial Regulation and Goals of
Competitiveness, Effectiveness,
Consistency and Cooperation
Joel P. Trachtman *
This article will examine limited features of the U.S. international
regulatory regimes associated with banking and securities in order to
compare recent approaches of these regimes to financial activity by for-
eigners in the U.S. and at home, and by U.S. persons or their subsidiaries
abroad. The features examined have been selected based on their central-
ity to the bank and securities regulation regimes, their particular interna-
tional concerns and the circumstance of recent administrative and
legislative emphasis. Similar methods of analysis could be applied to
other features.
The purpose of this examination is first, to review the basis for and
method of applying U.S. regulation in these functional areas to offshore
activities of U.S. persons and to both U.S. and offshore activities of for-
eign persons, and to understand the differences in approach taken by the
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advice and comments on a prior draft of this article, and to Melinda Harris and Elisabeth Shapiro
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) in interpreting
the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction under the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 (the BHC Act),1 the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities
Act)2 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).3 The
second purpose of this examination is to understand how these ap-
proaches compare and relate to certain international or regional initia-
tives, particularly those of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
(the Basle Committee) and the European Economic Community (the Eu-
ropean Community).
This article will examine initiatives relating to three basic and re-
lated types of financial regulation: first, regulation of financial institution
powers and prudence; second, regulation of financial institution capital;
and third, regulation of financial transactions. The principal U.S. regula-
tions that this article will discuss are:
1. Regulation K4 (including recent revisions thereof) under the BHC Act
and sections 255 and 25(a)6 of the Federal Reserve Act, concerned with the
types and extent of activities not normally permitted to U.S. banking orga-
nizations that subsidiaries of U.S. banking organizations and that foreign
banking organizations operating in the U.S. may undertake abroad;
2. Rule 15a-6 7 under the Exchange Act, concerned with the circum-
stances under which a foreign securities broker-dealer engaging in activities
in the U.S. will not be required to register as a U.S. broker-dealer under
Section 15(a)8 of the Exchange Act; and
3. Regulation S9 under the Securities Act (as well as the related TEFRA
D Rules' ° under the Internal Revenue Code), concerned with the circum-
stances under which a public offering of securities effected outside the U.S.
is not required to be registered under Section 511 of the Securities Act.
1 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (1988).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1988).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1988).
4 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1991) [hereinafter Regulation K]. The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System proposed certain changes to Regulation K on August 1, 1990. 12 C.F.R. § 211,
Docket No. R-0703, 55 F.R. 32423, Aug. 9, 1990, CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. [Current] 88,208
(1990) [hereinafter Regulation K Proposed Revisions]. With limited modifications, these revisions
were adopted on April 19, 1991. 12 C.F.R. § 211, Docket No. R-0703, 56 F.R. 19549, Apr. 29,
1991, CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. [Current] 88,444 (release) and CCH FED. BANKING L. REP.
31,411 et. seq. (1991) (revised regulation) [hereinafter Regulation K Revisions].
5 12 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1988).
6 12 U.S.C. § 615 et seq. (1988).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (1990). See text accompanying notes 97-122, infra.
8 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1988).
9 Regulation S-Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside the United States Without Re-
gistration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. 230.901-904 (1991) [hereinafter Regulation S].
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)(2)(i)(D) (1991).
11 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1988).
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These regimes established by the Board and the Commission go to'
the question of the extent of U.S. regulation of offshore financial activi-
ties. This article will compare these approaches with related bilateral
U.S. initiatives, with regional initiatives of the European Community and
with the Basle Committee's multilateral initiative in the area of capital
adequacy.
The question posed by this article is, why are there differences in the
reach and grasp of these aspects of bank and securities regulation? Fur-
ther, are these differences sensible, based on the varying purposes of these
laws? Are these differences justified by the legislation that underlies the
regulation-in other words, has the U.S. made these decisions at its high-
est policy levels, and should it? Are these differences defensible from the
standpoint of efficiency in international finance, and is the inconsistency
that in fact exists acceptable to other countries? If not, what alternative
approaches are available?
I. APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
Different countries have different approaches to finance. Despite the
revolution in Eastern Europe, many countries still allocate finance using
some degree of central planning. Many countries still use financial regu-
lation or guidance domestically to implement industrial or social policy
by directing finance toward selected uses in ways that the private market
would not. Even countries that emphasize the market as allocator of
finance have varying approaches to financial regulation, based on varying
regulatory experience, legal culture, economic history and regulatory
goals.
International financial regulation is one of the primary areas of at-
tention in connection with proposals to liberalize trade in services. Trade
in financial services is being addressed in the Uruguay Round under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).12 International fi-
nance, however, is not merely a service, but is also a critical factor of
production. Few doubt that aggregate worldwide welfare would be en-
hanced by permitting finance to flow freely to the uses selected by an
international free market process. All recognize that uncoordinated na-
tional regulatory systems are barriers to this flow.
In considering reform of regulation, it is necessary to consider the
costs and benefits of present structures, as well as the costs and benefits of
12 See, eg., Uruguay Round Service Negotiators Move to Small Groups in Hope of September
Texts, 57 BANKING REP. (BNA) 198 (July 29, 1991), indicating that talks on financial services trade
is "quite far advanced," based on two similar proposals to enhance requirements for national
treatment.
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proposed reforms. This process is complicated enough in the domestic
context, requiring careful scientific review of the social costs of, and so-
cial benefits from, regulation. However, in order to enhance worldwide
aggregate welfare, 3 it is necessary to consider regulation on the basis of
worldwide costs and worldwide benefits. This article seeks to begin to
consider how financial regulation initiatives may be evaluated in this
context.
The analytical factors that might be evaluated with respect to sub-
stantive domestic regulation include the social benefits expected to be
derived from the regulation and the social costs expected to be incurred
in order to implement the regulation. This calculus requires an added
dimension in order to evaluate international regulation. This added di-
mension includes the related problems of (a) regulatory effectiveness in
the context of transnational finance, (b) competitiveness of domestic fi-
nancial and non-financial enterprise in the global economy, (c) consis-
tency of approach with respect to the outside world, and (d) bases for
and methods of cooperation in international financial regulation. These
issues have an effect on the determination of regulatory structure and
scope.
A. Regulatory Effectiveness
There are two categories of regulatory concerns that merit special
consideration in the international context. First, international regulation
is concerned with regulatory effectiveness: to what extent does the dis-
continuity between transnational finance and national regulation dimin-
ish the effectiveness of regulation in accomplishing its purposes, and how
can effectiveness be maintained? Regulatory effectiveness will be chal-
lenged by transnational finance in different ways, depending on the type
of regulation involved. The discontinuity between transnational finance
and national regulation challenges regulators because it requires them to
apply regulation to persons or transactions that are not exclusively lo-
cated in their jurisdiction. This problem is often referred to as extraterri-
toriality: under what circumstances should national regulation govern
such persons or transactions? Extraterritoriality is ameliorated by either
agreeing on what the substantive domestic rules should be, so that it mat-
ters little which country's rules are applied, or agreeing on a method for
determining which country's substantive rules govern particular persons
13 It is not clear that this is any country's goal; in fact, the existence of protectionism belies this
as a possible goal. However, the success and demonstration effects of the European Community's




or transactions. Varying approaches may be appropriate for varying
types of regulation.
14
The general U.S. approach to extraterritoriality of regulatory autar-
chy and autarky has lost some of its force in recent years 5 as a result of a
recognition that regulatory effectiveness is compromised by failure to co-
operate with foreign regulators, especially in the enforcement area.
The increasing organization of enterprise in corporations, and par-
ticularly multinational corporate groups, allows greater flexibility to
business to engage in regulatory arbitrage, seeking to oust the jurisdiction
of national regulators that impose relatively high costs, in order to enjoy
the reduced cost of more efficient or more lax regulation in other jurisdic-
tions. While this process may have positive long-term effects as a disci-
pline on national regulation, as set forth below, in the short term, it may
diminish the effectiveness of regulation, including but not limited to en-
forcement. Effectiveness can be restored through enhanced cooperation.
This observation generates certain consequences under the principle
of subsidiarity. This principle would call for a comparison of different
social needs and regulatory techniques in the particular regulatory con-
text, based on differences of economic development, legal and political
culture and economic institutions, among others, in order to identify the
most efficient levels at which to provide regulation. In the context of
finance of large enterprise, the most efficient level of regulation may be
global, insofar as a universal culture of large-scale enterprise has had a
homogenizing effect on regulatory goals of economic efficiency, as well as
on possible regulatory techniques. There is already a level of business
integration in this area that involves global financial activity and arbi-
trage, as well as global regulatory arbitrage in finance. Thus, in order for
at least some aspects of large-scale financial regulation to be effective, it
must be coordinated, and perhaps also formulated, on a global basis.
14 Professor Scott and Ms. Key have recently suggested a matrix for analysis of different types of
bank regulation, with a view to clarifying the rules that should govern international trade in banking
services. They relate the decision among home country regulation, host country regulation and
harmonization to the means by which services are provided and to the regulatory or other policy
goals sought to be achieved. S. KEY & H. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN BANKING SERVICES:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (1991).
15 It probably reached its zenith in 1984 in connection with the Commission's proposed and
ultimately abandoned doctrine of "waiver by conduct." Under this doctrine, persons trading in U.S.
markets would be deemed to implicitly waive foreign bank secrecy and other protections afforded by
foreign law. Exchange Act Release No. 21,186, 31 SEC Docket (CCH) 14 (July 30, 1984). See
Fedders, Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets: Methods to Obtain Evidence Abroad, 18
INT'L LAW. 89 (1984).
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B. Competitiveness
Second, international regulation is concerned with competitiveness;
this concern is increasingly explicit. Competitiveness must be considered
from several perspectives. One perspective considers the regulatory costs
incurred by domestic business in comparison to those incurred by foreign
competitors: is the domestic regulatory system a negative "factor endow-
ment"? Another perspective considers the ability of domestic business to
compete in foreign markets: do domestic persons incur additional costs
in foreign host countries in order to comply with home country regula-
tion? Still a third perspective considers the ability of foreign competitors
to compete in local markets: are foreign competitors, who may benefit
from low home country regulatory costs, or even regulatory subsidies, or
who may otherwise be strong competitors, permitted to compete in do-
mestic markets? These issues are addressed explicitly in the formulation
of tax policy, where the burden on competitiveness is more apparent and
direct.
16
The policy direction indicated by the competitiveness concern is
often unrelated to or opposite to that indicated by the regulatory effec-
tiveness concern. Thus, in formulating policy, these concerns may be
required to be compromised between themselves, as well as with other
concerns. They will be least inconsistent if two conditions are fulfilled:
first, if the competitiveness concern is limited to the first perspective
mentioned above-limiting regulatory costs incurred by business-and
second, if the regulation concerned is market-facilitating rather than
market-inhibiting. That is, the competitive drive to limit regulatory costs
will be more consistent with the goal of regulatory effectiveness if regula-
tory effectiveness is defined in terms of ability to enhance economic effi-
ciency. This is so because if regulatory effectiveness is defined this way,
costs would not be permitted to exceed efficiency benefits. In addition,
16 See, e.g., Plambeck, Capital Neutrality and Coordinated Supervision: Lessons for International
Securities Regulation from the Law of International Taxation and Banking, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1988). International tax analysis considers three aspects of neutrality in connec-
tion with its attempt to provide economically neutral taxation. First, capital export neutrality calls
for equal taxation on domestic and foreign investment by domestic persons. Second, capital import
neutrality from the standpoint of a foreign host country calls for an equal tax burden on both foreign
and local investors in connection with local investments. Third, national neutrality calls for equal
tax receipts to the home country regardless of where its nationals' investments are made. These
principles are mutually inconsistent, insofar as they assume the propriety of tax jurisdiction on the
basis of both residence and source. For an economic analysis of the effects of competition, and of
coordination, among tax jurisdictions, see P. Musgrave & R. Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination and
Competition in an International Setting, in INFLUENCE OF TAX DIFFERENTIALS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE VIIITH MUNICH SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION (McLure, Sinn, Musgrave, et al. eds. 1990).
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positing economic efficiency as a harmonized goal would lead to conver-
gence of regulation, diminishing competitive inequalities.
Market-facilitating regulation is regulation that facilitates the opera-
tion of the financial market to allocate capital efficiently. Disclosure reg-
ulation in connection with public offerings of securities is an example.17
An example of market-inhibiting regulation might be regulation that pre-
vents banks from branching across state borders in the United States
when it would otherwise be economically efficient for them to do so.
This categorization is not intended to indicate that market-inhibiting reg-
ulation is necessarily to be avoided: such regulation may serve an impor-
tant social policy for which a society is willing to pay in terms of reduced
allocative efficiency. Rather, it is merely intended to indicate that where
regulatory costs are imposed merely to maintain the efficiency of the
market, and not to achieve other social goals, the costs will be minimized
in a way that promotes competitiveness.
The globalization of finance is a nemesis of inefficient financial regu-
lation. International trade disciplines domestic industry by subjecting it
to competition from abroad. On a higher plane, international trade disci-
plines domestic regulatory regimes. Inefficient regulation imposes costs
on domestic industry that are not commensurate with the social benefits
obtained. Even efficient, market-facilitating regulation can hinder the
competitiveness of domestic industry where lax foreign regulation im-
poses lower costs on foreign competitors. As more efficient financial reg-
ulation is developed in one national jurisdiction that can meet the needs
of economic efficiency and stability more effectively or at a lower social
cost than other methods, the retention of the other methods imposes an
unjustified cost on providers and users of finance. These costs render less
competitive the financial institutions, and the industrial firms that must
buy financing from these financial institutions, in the jurisdiction with
the less efficient regulation.
On February 5, 1991, pursuant to section 1001 of the Financial In-
stitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA), 8 Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady provided to Congress
17 There is a counter-argument to the effect that the market can impose its own disclosure disci-
plines. For a cogent analysis of these arguments, see Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case
for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717 (1984). For a discussion of the possible
differences between bank regulation and securities regulation in this regard, see Trachtman, Per-
estroika in Bank Regulation: Advantages of Securities Regulation for a Market Economy, in BANK
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN THE 1990's (J. Norton ed. 1991).
18 § 1001 of the FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA]. See, e.g., Gail, High-
lights ofthe Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA): What
Foreign Banks Should Know, 24 INT'L LAW. 225 (1990).
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a report entitled "Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations
for Safer, More Competitive Banks."1 9 On March 20, 1991, a bill was
introduced in Congress to implement the recommendations made in this
report.20 In this report and proposed legislation, the U.S. Treasury pro-
posed a wide-ranging reform of the U.S. system of bank regulation, with
principal goals to break down functional borders between banking and
the securities and insurance businesses, and between banking and com-
merce, as well as to break down barriers to interstate banking. This initi-
ative is motivated by the challenge of global economic competition. The
Treasury stated that "[a] sound, internationally competitive banking sys-
tem is critical to the Nation's economic vitality and the financial well-
being of our citizens.
2 1
The U.S. bank regulation and securities regulation regimes have
come under increasing competitive pressure to reduce regulatory costs
(including opportunity costs due to foregone business) to the minimum
necessary, in order to allow U.S. regulatory clients to compete on the
most favorable basis possible, consistent with regulatory goals. Adding
to this pressure are inconsistencies caused by the introduction of first,
less onerous foreign regulation of U.S. regulatory subjects operating
abroad and second, foreign financial organizations operating in the U.S.
that do not meet the requirements of U.S. regulatory law, but that cannot
reasonably be excluded. They cannot reasonably be excluded from the
U.S. market for two reasons: first, because the system of regulation
under which they operate has proven adequate to address the fundamen-
tal regulatory concerns that underlie U.S. regulation, and second, be-
cause their exclusion would prompt retaliation under the justification of
reciprocity.
C. Cooperation
Thus, from the standpoint of formulating international regulation,
the approach taken to competitiveness matters, as does the approach
taken to regulatory effectiveness. Both these factors will have an effect
on a particular country's willingness to cooperate with other countries,
either explicitly or implicitly.
Implicit cooperation may take the form of unilateral action that de-
19 Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for Safer,
More Competitive Banks (1991) [hereinafter Treasury Report]. The Treasury Report, or at least a
study of the federal deposit insurance system, was mandated by § 1001 of the FIRREA, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811 (1989).
20 S. 713, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Treasury Bill]. This bill has been the subject
of intense debate, and at the date of this article, had not been passed in any form.
21 Treasury Report, supra note 19, at ix.
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fers to other countries by limiting the scope of regulatory jurisdiction or
providing de jure and de facto national treatment to foreign nationals,
with expectations and hopes, or even unilateral requirements, of recipro-
cation by the foreign government. The reciprocation may amount to a
tacit, consciously parallel agreement with foreign countries. Another
form of implicit cooperation unilaterally provides benefits to foreign
countries that provide reciprocal benefits: unilateral reciprocity.
Explicit cooperation involves bilateral, regional or multilateral
agreements, establishing institutional structures to constrain future ac-
tion. The first level of explicit cooperation would involve reciprocal
agreements to provide national treatment. This would involve no reduc-
tion of national regulatory effectiveness, and would compromise only one
type of competitiveness: the ability explicitly to exclude foreign competi-
tors. National treatment is a complex concept with significant difficul-
ties, but can be treated here as impartial application of host country rules
to foreign entities.22 A reciprocal national treatment standard, assuming
it could be judged and enforced impartially, would reduce intentional
barriers to trade in financial services. It would have little effect on de
facto or unintentional barriers arising from differences in national regula-
tion. It would also have little effect on regulatory differences that are not
significant as barriers, but that merely reduce efficiency and raise the
costs of transnational flow of finance.
A second level of explicit cooperation would involve agreement on
reduction of unintentional barriers. This might involve agreement on
compromise of regulatory effectiveness in order to provide de facto na-
tional treatment, or even better-than-national treatment, to foreign
competitors.
A third level of explicit cooperation would seek to reduce regulatory
differences that do not amount to significant defacto barriers, but that by
virtue of their mere difference, raise the costs of transnational flow of
finance. This type of cooperation would compromise regulatory effec-
tiveness to the extent that it requires general changes in national regula-
tion that would reduce the ability to effectively address regulatory goals
that had previously been addressed. It would compromise competitive
concerns to the extent that such concerns are protectionist rather than
liberal. It would require joint legislation, which would necessitate a high
level of congruence of policy and approach, and which would benefit
from an institutional and constitutional infrastructure that would facili-
22 For a detailed discussion of the concept of national treatment, see Key, Is National Treatment
Still Viable? US Policy in Theory and Practice, 5 J.INT'L BANKING L. 365 (1990).
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tate agreement, as well as neutral enforcement without the possibility of
retaliation for defection or alleged defection.
D. Consistency and Mode of International Discourse
In order to consider how the concerns for regulatory effectiveness
and competitiveness are evaluated and compromised in international co-
operation, it is necessary to consider the actors involved and the context
and fora in which they work.
In the U.S. context, much authority has been delegated to or as-
sumed by functional administrative agencies to determine how to apply
U.S. regulation to persons or transactions that do not relate exclusively
to the United States. This authority has been exercised in establishing
unilateral frameworks of reciprocity or deference, as well as, in the case
of capital requirements for banks, in establishing agreed substantive
rules. Because of the failure to address these issues at the highest legisla-
tive policy level, there is a good deal of incoherence of policy among
functional agencies, within functional agencies and between the func-
tional agencies and another group of decision-makers: the courts. This
atomization of international regulatory policy authority has adverse con-
sequences for the ability to cooperate effectively.
In each of the areas of regulation discussed in this article, prescrip-
tive jurisdiction is exercised over foreign persons or transactions for dif-
ferent reasons and under different circumstances. Thus there is
inconsistency in the extraterritorial scope of varying types of U.S. finan-
cial regulation. There is also inconsistency within types of regulation.
These inconsistencies arise from variation in the basis for application of
U.S. law: nationality, territorial effects and territorial conduct.
For example, in banking regulation, nationality is used as a basis to
regulate the activities of U.S. banks abroad, while territoriality is used to
regulate the activities of foreign banks in the United States. The nation-
ality basis is congruent with the principal thrust of U.S. banking regula-
tion, which regulates institutions in order to ensure their safety and
soundness, but it is extended by the territorial conduct principle where
foreign banks do business in the United States, in order to avoid possible
gaps in regulation, as well as competitive discrimination against U.S.
firms. Similarly, a relatively small amount of U.S. conduct could result
in a foreign broker-dealer being subjected to the full panoply of U.S. bro-
ker-dealer regulation with respect to its foreign operations, in order to
protect U.S. customers from foreign broker-dealers that are not subject
to U.S. regulation.




it is not necessarily appropriate. When each regulator forms its approach
to these problems, it often pays little heed to the approach taken by the
other regulators, to the approach used by foreign regulators, or to the
need to cooperate with foreign regulators. It should consider these is-
sues, because the United States is a polity of limited powers, the limits in
scope of which are not specifically defined.2 3 This lack of definition in
the Constitution, in U.S. statutes and in international law should not be
regarded as an invitation to excess, but rather as a source of responsibil-
ity, where unilateral action is necessary, to act on a coherent basis, with
due regard for the aggregate of U.S. assertions of prescriptive power and
the limits of that power, as well as for the actions by foreign counterparts
in similar circumstances.
U.S. regulators should consider the approach taken by other U.S.
regulators in order to present to the outside world a coherent vision of
the scope of U.S. powers, unfragmented by varying levels of regulatory
zeal lacking the moderation that would be instilled by a larger perspec-
tive. They should consider the approach taken by foreign regulators be-
cause the problem of overlapping and inconsistent regulation among
countries can only be resolved by explicit or implicit agreement with
other regulators regarding the scope of permissible application of law:
agreement on conflict of laws rules. In the European Community's sin-
gle market initiative, this agreement on which country's law governs is
predicated upon a minimal agreement on the content of law. Thus, con-
sistency of internal approach requires a high degree of formal and infor-
mal cooperation among regulators within the United States, while
consistency of approach among countries is a prerequisite for competitive
fairness and to avoid the application of regulation being used to promote
domestic industry in an escalating regulatory trade war that would be
costly to all.
E. Problems of Authorization
Congress has often declined to squarely address the issue of regula-
tory scope.2 4 For example, in connection with antitrust laws, 25 securities
23 Neither the Constitution nor international law provides firm guidance as to the scope of a
state's power, although it might be argued that these sources should, if they do nothing else, define
the scope of the prescriptive power of our country.
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2), comment c (1971). See also
Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional
Appraisal, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 15 (Summer 1987). The Supreme Court, in Boureslan
v. Arabian American Oil Company, 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), has recently held that certain statutory
U.S. civil rights (under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) are inapplicable to the activities of
U.S. businesses operating abroad, as Congress did not evince sufficient intent that they be so applica-
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laws, 26 export control laws,27 certain aspects of the tax laws, 28 and cer-
tain aspects of intellectual property laws, 29 U.S. statutes are unclear as to
the scope of jurisdiction intended to be exercised, at least in the sense
that they claim prescriptive jurisdiction over matters that exceed the
grasp of the United States. Congress appears to assume that it is not
limited by international law in its assertion of jurisdiction.
At the time that many of these laws were first enacted, the main
concern of Congress regarding foreign activity was evasion of U.S. rules
by people who deserved to have these rules applied to them, so the scope
of application was drafted expansively in order to avoid providing a
roadmap for evasion. However, there are other reasons, most of which
are beyond the scope of this article.
First, the U.S. has not moderated the scope of its jurisdiction be-
cause it has not been required to do so. One reason why the U.S. has not
been required to moderate the scope of its jurisdiction is its heretofore
preeminent economic and political power in the world, making other
countries unwilling to confront the U.S. over these issues. As has been
discussed in other contexts, the balance of power is continually shifting,
and this reason for failure to moderate is less applicable today.
Second, the U.S. has not moderated the scope of its jurisdiction be-
cause in the past it has been easier to see extraterritorial assertions of
jurisdiction as something less than a policy conflict: the U.S. was prohib-
iting activities that foreign governments did not condone or encourage,
but had not gotten around to prohibiting. The U.S. was filling a regula-
tory gap, acting as business police to the world. This is no longer accept-
ble. This has been viewed by some commentators as a challenge to Congress to clarify the extraterri-
torial reach of these provisions.
25 The literature regarding extraterritoriality in antitrust is voluminous. A relatively recent and
thoughtful opinion, citing much of the literature, is Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Air-
lines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Judge Wilkey criticized the reasonableness test, described in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 403 and
415 (1987). In addition, the Department of Justice has promulgated Antitrust Enforcement Guide-
lines for International Operations, giving an executive perspective on proper means to determine the
scope of prescriptive jurisdiction under the antitrust laws. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforce-
ment Guidelines for International Operations, reprinted in 55 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988). See also Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15
U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
26 See, e.g., Sachs, The International Reach of Rule l0b-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677 (1990).
27 See, eg., Abbott, Defining the Extraterritorial Reach of American Export Controls: Congress
as Catalyst, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 79 (1984).
28 See discussion of the TEFRA-D rules at text accompanying notes 174-178, infra.
29 See, e.g., American Rice, Inc. v. The Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Assn., 701 F.2d 408
(5th Cir. 1983) (extraterritorial reach of U.S. trademark law); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo




able for two reasons. The absence of a prohibition in foreign law is
increasingly viewed as an affirmative policy decision to permit certain
activity, especially in free market economies. And the U.S. is not viewed
as having state-of-the-art, neutral business regulation. Others have eval-
uated U.S. regulation and devised other structures that they find more
appropriate.
The above serve as explanations for congressional silence on the is-
sue of extraterritorial scope. The regulators have largely filled the gap
left by Congress, and have done so from the perspective of fulfilling their
specific regulatory function in accordance with their legislative and polit-
ical mandates. However, this perspective is incomplete.
II. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION POWERS AND PRUDENTIAL
REGULATION: REGULATION K AND THE SECOND
BANKING DIRECTIVE
This section will consider certain critical features of U.S. bank regu-
lation relating to institutional powers that have raised concerns regarding
competitiveness and interaction with foreign standards. It will then de-
scribe how Regulation K ameliorates these concerns, both for U.S. bank-
ing organizations and for foreign banking organizations operating within
the United States, and how the recently adopted revisions to Regulation
K were intended to further ameliorate these concerns. It will next con-
sider how the approach of Regulation K differs from, and interacts with,
the European Community's Second Banking Directive.30 Finally, it will
examine institutional regulation of securities firms under the European
Community's proposed Investment Services Directive31 (which is mod-
elled on the Second Banking Directive) and the Commission's recently
promulgated Rule 15a-6.
30 Second Council Directive of December 15, 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions
and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 386) 1 (1989) (Council Directive
89/646/EEC) [hereinafter Second Banking Directive]. There are two companion directives to the
Second Banking Directive: Council Directive of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio for Credit
Institutions, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 386) 14 (1989) (Council Directive 89/647/EEC) [hereinaf-
ter Solvency Ratio Directive]; Council Directive of 17 April 1989 on the Own Funds of Credit Institu-
tions, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 124) 16 (1989) (Council Directive 89/299/EEC) [hereinafter Own
Funds Directive]. For a discussion of the purposes and mechanics of the Second Banking Directive,
see, eg., Gruson & Feuring, The New Banking Law of the European Community, 25 ITrr'L LAW. 1
(1991); Zavvos, Banking Integration and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy Implications, 31 HARV.
INr'L L.J. 463 (1990).
31 Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 33 0.
J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 42) 7 (1990) (Commission Notice No. 90/c 42/06) [hereinafter Investment
Services Directive]. This directive has been subject to significant negotiation, and subsequent infor-
mal drafts have appeared.
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A. Certain Salient Features of U.S. Domestic Bank Regulation
U.S. domestic bank regulation has two main features that raise diffi-
cult issues for the world of international finance. These features were
inspired by some of the abuses that are blamed for the Great Depression
of 1929, and as in the securities area, the broad themes of U.S. bank
regulation were established in the New Deal legislation of the early
1930s. Many now question their propriety when adopted, or their con-
tinuing validity, and they have been proposed to be modified significantly
in the Treasury's recently proposed legislation.32
First, commercial banking-the business of taking deposits and
making loans-is separated, to a diminishing but still significant extent,
from both the securities business33 and from most other areas of general
commerce. Banking organizations cannot generally engage in securities
underwriting or dealing, and securities organizations cannot generally
engage in deposit-taking. Banking organizations also cannot generally
own or be owned by commercial or industrial firms.34 These regulatory
themes of separation are increasingly questioned 35 as possibly over-re-
32 See Treasury Bill, supra note 20. The Treasury Report, supra note 19, recommends a number
of important reforms, which would be implemented by the Treasury Bill. These include (a) nation-
wide banking, (b) permission for banking organizations to engage in new financial activities, (c)
permission for commercial ownership of banking organizations, and (d) reform of deposit insurance
that would involve a reduced scope for deposit insurance and capital-linked risk-based premiums for
deposit insurance. These reforms all have important ramifications for international banking. An
effort has been made to apply these reforms to the operations of foreign banking entities on a na-
tional treatment basis, but of course, given differences in home country regulation and banking struc-
ture, national treatment can amount to de facto discrimination. In addition, these reforms will affect
the competitive position of U.S. banking organizations operating in foreign markets.
33 See, e.g., Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377-378 (1988) (prohibiting
banks from dealing in and underwriting securities, and limiting bank securities activities to agency
activities upon the order of their customers) [hereinafter Glass-Steagall Act]. The Glass-Steagall
Act has been the subject of extensive recent commentary, and is the subject of imminent reform.
See, eg., Norton, Up Against "The Wall" Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated ("Rer-
egulated") Banking Environment, 42 Bus. LAW. 327 (1987); Note, The European Community's Sec-
ond Banking Directive: Can Antiquated United States Legislation Keep Pace?, 23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 615 (1990). In addition, the Treasury Report, supra note 19, proposes relaxing the
prohibitions of Glass-Steagall for certain well-capitalized banks.
34 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988) (limiting the activities of banks to the business of banking) and 12
U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1988) (limiting the activities of and types of subsidiaries held by bank holding
companies).
35 The Bush administration has recently proposed a complete revision of the U.S. approach to
this separation. Treasury Bill, supra note 20. In addition, there have been a number of smaller
breaches in the Glass-Steagall wall. The most significant is the Board's approval of applications of
bank holding companies under Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988), to
underwrite and deal in "ineligible" debt and equity securities. See, eg., J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., et
al., 75 Federal Reserve Bulletin 192 (1989). For a relevant discussion of developments under Section
20, see Eisenberg, The Effect of Recent U.S. Bank Regulatory Developments on Accommodating Eu-
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strictive,a6 especially given the growing recognition of fumgibility of bank
finance and securities finance, as well as the growing involvement in fi-
nancial sector activities by industrial companies. Simply put, as broker-
age houses, insurance companies, auto and appliance manufacturers and
other non-banks offer more and more products that compete with tradi-
tional bank services, it has become less realistic and fair to prevent banks
from offering a broader range of financial and related services. On the
other hand, the thrift crisis has underscored the need to be wary of
deregulatory initiatives that may disturb the delicate balance between
maintaining incentives for individual initiative and responsibility in bank
management, and prudential regulation that protects the financial system
and the federal safety net from excessive risk.3 7
Thus, in connection with its separation of banking from other busi-
nesses, the U.S. bank regulatory regime contains a significant and ear-
nestly-held policy difference from many foreign regulatory regimes,
including that of the Second Banking Directive, which adopts a universal
banking structure, allowing banking organizations to engage in a wide
range of securities business, as well as other business, including, subject
to certain limitations, non-financial business.3" This difference arises
from a different economic and regulatory history, a different financial
institution structure and a different regulatory, legal and political
culture.
This difference raises two sets of issues in international finance: (i)
when U.S. banking organizations operate abroad, to what extent are they
still restricted by U.S. regulation that restricts their powers in order to
guard their safety and soundness; and (ii) will foreign banking organiza-
tions that may engage in other businesses abroad that are not permitted
to banking organizations in the U.S. be restricted in their access to the
U.S. banking market? This is a conflict between two bases for prescrip-
tive jurisdiction: territoriality and nationality. The U.S. applies its rules
to its nationals (and their subsidiaries) wherever they operate, with some
amelioration for foreign operations. It also applies its rules to foreign
persons operating within the U.S. with respect to their U.S. operations
and to a limited extent with respect to their operations abroad. Interna-
ropean Views of Appropriate Bank Securities Powers, in 1992 IN EUROPE, A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL
GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (1990).
36 Insofar as the abuse to which they are addressed can be prevented by less restrictive measures.
37 See, eg., Gail & Norton, A Decade's Journey From "Deregulation" to "Supervisory Reregula-
tion'" The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW.
1103 (1990).
38 See text accompanying notes 69-95, infra. The Second Banking Directive does not require
member states to permit banks to engage in the insurance business.
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tional law provides little well-accepted restriction on exercise of jurisdic-
tion on this type of overlapping basis. U.S. courts will look to the intent
of Congress in order to determine whether Congress intended a particu-
lar statute to apply outside the U.S.3 9 The Glass-Steagall Act itself con-
tains no geographic limitation, nor does it or its legislative history
contain any expression of an intent to cover overseas operations. The
Supreme Court's recent analysis in Boureslan v. Arabian American Oil
Company would indicate that, given the failure of Congress to express an
intent to apply the Glass-Steagall Act abroad, it should not be so ap-
plied.' However, the BHC Act has provisions that indicate an intent to
apply some of these principles to the operations of bank holding compa-
nies abroad, and Regulation K, formulated by the Board, responds to
both sets of issues.
Second, commercial banks operating in the U.S. have been subjected
to severe restrictions on interstate branching and other geographical ex-
pansion.41 These restrictions stand in sharp contrast to the thrust of the
Second Banking Directive toward extreme liberalization of geographic
restrictions on competition in banking and financial services within the
European Community. In effect, the European Community's single mar-
ket has gone the U.S.' not-quite-single market one better, by creating a
true single market in banking and financial services, while the U.S. so far
continues to limit the ability of domestic banking organizations and for-
eign banking organizations to operate throughout the United States.42
B. Regulation K
In April 1991, in response to concerns about the competitiveness of
U.S. banking organizations in operations abroad, the Board revised Reg-
ulation K to permit U.S. banking organizations to expand the scope of
their international activities. The Regulation K Revisions cover several
39 The Supreme Court, in Boureslan v. Arabian American Oil Company, 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991),
has recently held that certain statutory U.S. civil rights (under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act) are inapplicable to the activities of U.S. businesses operating abroad, as Congress did not evince
sufficient intent that they be so applicable. This has been viewed by some commentators as a chal-
lenge to Congress to clarify the extraterritorial reach of these provisions.
40 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
41 McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988) (limiting branching by national banks). In addition, 12
U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988), the "Douglas Amendment" to the BHC Act, imposes limitations on the
ability of a bank holding company to acquire an out-of-state bank, unless permitted by the laws of
the other state. The latter restrictions are made less problematic by state statutes that permit such
acquisitions. See Shoenhair & Spong, Interstate Bank Expansion: A Comparison Across Individual
States, in BANKING STUDIES, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 1-23 (1990), for a de-
scription of various state laws regarding interstate banking.




areas. The areas that will be discussed here are (i) a liberalization of the
authority of U.S. banking organizations to engage in underwriting and
dealing equity securities abroad; and (ii) a clarification of the criteria for
granting exemptions from the restrictions of U.S. banking law to certain
foreign banking organizations operating within the U.S.43 Under section
25 of the Federal Reserve Act,'W the Edge Act45 and the BHC Act, the
Board is authorized to permit U.S. banking organizations to engage in a
broader array of activities abroad than is permitted within the United
States.
Foreign branches of U.S. banks are authorized, under section 25 of
the Federal Reserve Act, to exercise such further powers as may be usual
in connection with the banking business in the place where the branch is
located, subject to the Board's regulation, and subject to statutory
prohibitions on commercial and securities activities.46 Edge Act subsidi-
aries of banks or of bank holding companies are permitted to engage in
such activities as may be usual, in the determination of the Board, in
connection with the business of banking or other financial operations in
the countries in which they act. 7
Section 4(c)(13) of the BHC Act48 provides an exemption from the
limitations on holding interests in non-banking organizations-the limi-
tation on the businesses that a bank holding company may engage in
through subsidiaries-imposed by Section 4 of the BHC Act for subsidi-
aries that do no business in the United States, if the Board determines by
regulation or order that the exemption would not be "substantially at
variance with the purposes of [the BHC Act] and would be in the public
interest."
Although the statutory standards for the exercise of the Board's dis-
cretion thus differ under each of these provisions, Congress clearly au-
thorized the Board to make compromises between the goals of regulatory
effectiveness-concerns for the integrity of the federal safety net-and
competitiveness in connection with the foreign operations of U.S. bank-
ing organizations. It is notable that Congress gave little statutory gui-
dance to the Board as to how to make this compromise. Under its own
43 In addition, the Regulation K Revisions include liberalization of investments by U.S. banking
organizations under the general consent procedures (without specific Board approval), liberalization
of foreign portfolio investments by U.S. banking organizations, and increasing the scope of entities
to which Edge corporations may provide full banking services in the United States. Regulation K
Revisions, supra note 4.
44 12 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1988).
45 12 U.S.C. §§ 611, 611(a) (1988).
46 12 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1988).
47 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (1988).
48 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13) (1988).
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interpretation of these standards, set forth in Regulation K, the Board is
permitted to authorize those activities that it finds to be "usual in con-
nection with the transaction of banking or other financial operations
abroad," so long as the activity is consistent with the safety and sound-
ness of the relevant U.S. entities.4 9 Regulation K articulates the Board's
views as to what is permitted under this standard.
1. Securities Activities of US. Banking Organizations Abroad under
Regulation K
Regulation K permits foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks and bank
holding companies to underwrite (purchase for resale in a primary secur-
ities offering) and deal (purchase for resale in secondary securities trans-
actions) in debt and equity securities outside the United States, subject to
certain limits on underwriting and dealing in equity securities."0 In its
release proposing the Regulation K Revisions, the Board recognized that
these limits on underwriting and dealing in equity securities reduce the
ability of U.S. banking organizations to compete abroad." The Regula-
tion K Revisions raise equity underwriting limits to the lesser of $60 mil-
lion or 25% of the investor's52 Tier 1 capital.5 3 The prior limit was the
lesser of $2 million or 20% of the voting shares or capital and surplus of
any one issuer, although the use of multiple foreign underwriting subsidi-
aries could allow a banking organization on a consolidated basis to have
commitments aggregating up to $15 million.54 The permission to engage
in these activities abroad, subject to limits, represents a compromise be-
tween regulatory effectiveness and competitiveness. The expansion of the
limits represents a change in the nature of the compromise.
The Glass-Steagall Act applies domestically without benefit of these
exceptions, although it is increasingly subject to other exceptions. One
immediate question is, if the separation of commercial banking from in-
49 Regulation K Proposed Revisions, supra note 4, at 96,677.
50 Regulation K, supra note 4, at § 211.5(d)(13).
51 Regulation K Proposed Revisions, supra note 4, at 96,678.
52 The "investor" would be the bank holding company, an Edge corporation or a member bank,
depending on which is the closest parent to the foreign company. Thus, where the investor is an
Edge corporation, which is frequent, the limitations on the capitalization of the Edge corporation
would limit its ability to engage in underwriting activities. Section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act
limits member bank investments in Edge corporations in the aggregate to 10% of bank capital. 12
U.S.C. § 615(c) (1988). If a bank holding company were to invest directly in a foreign securities
subsidiary, or in an Edge corporation, this limit would not apply.
53 Tier I capital is defined in the Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State Member Banks: Risk-
Based Measure, 12 C.F.R. part 208, app. A (1991).
54 The $2 million or 20% of capital and surplus or voting shares of the issuer was contained in
former § 211.5(d)(13). The ability to aggregate among multiple subsidiaries was limited by the in-
vestment limits under § 211.5(c)(1), requiring Board consent for investments exceeding $15 million.
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vestment banking is an important regulatory principle, why is it relaxed
with respect to U.S. banking organizations' operations abroad? Competi-
tive pressure is only part of the answer. The other part of the answer is
that this regulatory principle is increasingly discredited. A principle that
is increasingly recognized as subject to question, in part because it is not
included in foreign regulation, is compromised at the international level
in order to meet competitive pressure there." Of course, the competitive
pressure would exist at home as well, if U.S. regulation were not applied
to foreign banking organizations operating in the United States to gener-
ally prevent them from engaging within the United States in businesses
forbidden to U.S. banking organizations. Thus, while the safety and
soundness rationale cannot support the application of these restrictions
to foreign banking organizations operating in the U.S., it is important to
apply these restrictions to these entities in order to avoid competitive
unfairness to domestic banking organizations. Idiosyncratic domestic
regulation thus leads to inapposite regulation of foreign entities to avoid
competitive unfairness.
On the other hand, assuming it has been determined that allowing
U.S. banking organizations to engage in the securities business abroad on
a limited basis does not pose threats to the stability of the U.S. financial
structure, not to mention the federal deposit insurance system, sufficient
to overcome arguments based on competitive pressure, why does it mat-
ter where the activities are carried out? It may be that the Board feels it
appropriate to limit its departures from its basic regulatory principle to
the specific competitive circumstances-foreign operations-that justify
the exceptions. In addition, the Board has stated that "decisions on the
appropriate structure for broader powers for U.S. banking organizations
should properly be made in a wider context."56
There is a degree of asymmetry to the Board's position, insofar as it
permits U.S. banking organizations increased powers in foreign markets,
at the same time that it continues to deny these powers to foreign bank-
ing organizations operating in the United States. Thus, a foreign bank
might question the fairness of a liberalization that benefits only U.S.
banks operating abroad, and not foreign banks operating in the United
States, when the principle being liberalized is just as applicable abroad as
55 See text accompanying notes 78-95 for a discussion of the pressures for domestic change aris-
ing from both (i) concerns that U.S. regulation is more restrictive than foreign regulation, and (ii)
concerns that the U.S. does not offer effective national treatment or equivalent market access suffi-
cient to satisfy requirements for reciprocity in connection with liberalization under the Second Bank-
ing Directive. As discussed therein, these pressures for deregulatory harmonization challenge long-
held regulatory principles.
56 Regulation K Proposed Revisions, supra note 4, at 97,692-93.
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it is at home. In fact, it might argue that allowing a foreign banking
organization to engage in securities activities in the United States poses
less of a threat to the stability of the U.S. financial system and to the
federal safety net than allowing U.S. banking organizations to engage in
these activities abroad. It poses little more of a threat than permitting
the foreign banking organization to engage in securities activities in its
home market. The greater concern, and the motivation for applying
these restrictions to foreign banks, is competitive equality with U.S.
banking organizations.
2. Activities of Foreign Banking Organizations in the United States
under Regulation K
Section 8(a) of the International Banking Act of 1978,17 extends the
restrictions on non-banking activities of the BHC Act to (i) any foreign
bank maintaining a branch or agency in any state, (ii) any foreign bank
or foreign company controlling a foreign bank that controls a commer-
cial lending company organized under state law and (iii) any parent of
any company referred to in clauses (i) or (ii). Sections 2(h)(2) and 4(c)(9)
of the BHC Act provide for exemption of certain activities of foreign
banking organizations from the BHC Act's prohibitions on non-banking
activities. These provisions of the BHC Act are departures from national
treatment intended in part to limit the extraterritorial effect on foreign
banking organizations of the U.S. restrictions on the activities of banks.
Thus, a foreign banking organization that engages abroad in activities
that would not be permitted to a U.S. bank may, depending upon the
nature of its foreign non-banking activities, nevertheless be permitted to
operate in the United States. This is an example of what may be called
"better-than-national treatment." That is, the foreign person operating in
the United States is subject to a less restrictive U.S. regulatory regime
outside the United States than the U.S. person outside the United States.
This approach is the converse of the liberalization under Regulation K of
the activities in which a U.S. banking organization may engage abroad,
discussed above.
This form of reverse discrimination raises competitive concerns, but
it is premised on two principles. The first principle is that the United
States is most concerned about the soundness of its domestic banking
organizations, as threats to the soundness of foreign banking organiza-
tions do not threaten the U.S. financial system or the federal safety net
with the same magnitude as do threats to the soundness of domestic
57 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1988).
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banking organizations. Of course, in an increasingly interdependent fi-
nancial world, this principle has diminished validity. For example, U.S.
money-center banks have extensive financial relations with foreign
money-center banks, in the form of interbank deposits, interest rate and
currency swap transactions and payment and clearance functions. Fur-
ther, foreign banking organizations that take retail deposits in the United
States are covered, with respect to those deposits, by the U.S. federal
deposit insurance system. 8
The second principle is one of comity, anticipation of reciprocity
and recognition of the limits of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction: a percep-
tion that the activity restrictions of the U.S. bank regulation regime
should not generally apply to foreign activities of foreign persons on the
mere basis of their engagement in permitted activities in the United
States, and should not be a basis for excluding them from U.S. markets.
Other countries have different approaches to bank regulation, and those
other countries are entitled to implement their approaches on at least a
territorial basis, without additional restrictions imposed by the United
States. However, it should be recognized that this approach subjects the
U.S. banking system to the risk that the foreign regulatory regime is in-
sufficient, as a failure of the foreign banking organization with operations
in the United States will have an adverse effect on the U.S. financial sys-
tem, and may even implicate the U.S. deposit insurance system. In this
sense, there is an implicit element of mutual recognition of home state
regulation, accepting home state regulation as reasonably adequate to
justify the acceptance of these risks, despite its differences from U.S.
regulation.
From the home country's perspective, and as fully recognized by the
European Community, this is a trade issue.5 9, From this perspective, U.S.
refusal of entry to a foreign banking organization that engages at home in
activities that do not fit within U.S. regulatory conceptions of "banking"
would be a non-tariff barrier to trade in services. The primary purpose of
the Second Banking Directive is to eliminate such barriers within the
European Community; a secondary purpose, which is sought through the
use of the reciprocity provisions of the Second Banking Directive, is to
reduce such barriers to European Community banking organizations
58 12 U.S.C. § 3104 (1988) requires that U.S. branches of foreign banks carry Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation deposit insurance if they accept significant retail deposits. U.S. bank subsidi-
aries of foreign banking organizations would be subject to the general requirements for Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation deposit insurance coverage. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1988).
59 For a discussion of the GATT context, see, e.g., Zavvos, supra note 30, at 501, and the Draft
Sectoral Annex on Financial Services Presented Under Canadian Sponsorship at General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade Talks in Brussels, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1854 (Dec. 5, 1990).
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outside the European Community. From the U.S. perspective, Regula-
tion K seeks unilaterally to reduce such barriers, but only to a limited
extent.
In order to do so, Section 211.23 of Regulation K provides exemp-
tions from certain U.S. restrictions to "qualifying foreign banking organi-
zations" (QFBOs). These exemptions articulate the provisions of
Sections 2(h)(2) and 4(c)(9) of the BHC Act, discussed in more detail
below. A QFBO is a foreign banking organization whose non-U.S. bank-
ing business (based on at least two out of three of its assets, revenues and
net income) is greater than its worldwide non-banking business and
whose foreign banking business is greater than its U.S. banking business.
The essential thrust of the test is to determine whether the foreign bank-
ing organization is primarily a "bank" in its operations abroad, and has
the greater part of its banking operations abroad. Thus, entities that are
not banks by the specified standards, or that conduct the greater part of
their banking operations within the United States, would not be QFBOs.
The second prong of this test has an obvious rationale: if entities with
primarily U.S. banking businesses are permitted exemptions from the re-
strictions of the BHC Act in their operations abroad, in addition to those
set forth in Regulation K, then the BHC Act will soon be eviscerated.
While such evisceration may appear desirable to some, it cannot be ac-
ceptable from the standpoint of the Board, as it would be inconsistent
with the clear intent of Congress and the expressed responsibilities of the
Board.
The first prong-requiring that the foreign banking organization be
primarily a bank in its operations abroad-is more interesting. Its test is
regulo-centric ° insofar as U.S. standards under Section 211.5(d) of Reg-
ulation K itself are used to determine which foreign activities are in-
cluded within "banking." While Section 211.5(d) purports to be a list of
activities that are "usual in connection with the transaction of banking or
other financial operations abroad," it would be more accurate to describe
it as a list of activities that the Board has determined to be permissible
for U.S. banking organizations operating abroad. It by no means repre-
sents an international consensus on what activities are appropriate for
banks, and thus may disadvantage foreign entities with substantial activi-
ties that are not included on the list, but nevertheless consider themselves
banks. Moreover, it was originally intended as a means to allow U.S.
banks to compete in foreign markets, while limiting the risks to the U.S.
banking system from these liberalized powers, whereas it is used in this
60 This word is used to mean that the test regards the world through the prism of U.S. regula-
tion, without taking account of other states' policies or regulation.
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context as a means of limiting the operations abroad of foreign banks.
Although the use of this standard has a certain unilateral transnational
symmetry-requiring the foreign activities of foreign persons engaged in
U.S. banking to conform to some extent to the activities permissible to
U.S. banking organizations operating abroad-it might be viewed by for-
eign banking organizations as an unjustified projection abroad of U.S.
regulatory principles. In this context, it is appropriate to consider the
possible regulatory rationales for this prong of the test for QFBO status.
Section 2(h)(2) of the BHC Act provides an exemption from the
prohibitions of Section 4 of the BHC Act-which limits interests held by
bank holding companies in non-banking organizations-for acquisitions
of foreign companies principally engaged in business outside the United
States by foreign bank holding companies that are principally engaged in
the banking business outside the United States. Section 2(h)(1), which is
subject to Section 2(h)(2), otherwise purports to extend the application of
the BHC Act generally to transactions outside the United States and to
companies organized outside the United States.
Section 4(c)(9) exempts from the prohibitions of Section 4:
[S]hares held or activities conducted by any company organized under the
laws of a foreign country the greater part of whose business is conducted
outside the United States, if the Board by regulation or order determines
that, under the circumstances and subject to the conditions set forth in the
regulation or order, the exemption would not be substantially at variance
with the purposes of this chapter and would be in the public interest.
Thus, while Section 2(h)(2) seems to support the requirement that
the foreign banking organization be principally engaged in banking
(without specifying a definition of banking), Section 4(c)(9) provides
wide authority for the Board to exempt foreign companies principally
engaged in foreign business from the restrictions of Section 4. As with
the provisions of the BHC Act forming the basis for the Regulation K
provisions permitting U.S. bank holding companies to engage in a wider
range of activities abroad than in the United States, Sections 2(h)(2) and
4(c)(9) and the rules thereunder evince legislative abdication and regula-
tory arrogation of the power to decide how far U.S. bank regulation will
extend abroad.
As discussed above, the Board, in Regulation K, has exercised this
power to limit its exemption to those foreign companies that are princi-
pally engaged abroad in "banking". No specific definition is provided for
banking, but Section 211.23(c)(2) of Regulation K refers to the list of
activities contained in Section 211.5(d) as included within the term
"banking" when conducted within the foreign banking organization by a
foreign bank or its subsidiaries. The Board has promulgated the list con-
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tained in Section 211.5(d) on the basis of its interpretation of the pur-
poses of the BHC Act and the public interest. However, this limitation
may block access to the U.S. market by foreign "universal" banks, which
may derive a significant portion of their business from other activities,
such as securities or insurance.6" With the implementation of the Second
Banking Directive, which will come into force by the end of 1992, more
European banks will be universal banks,62 and it is expected that more
merger activity will take place among European financial institutions.
These two phenomena combined will increase the difficulties arising from
the application of U.S. restrictions to the foreign business of foreign fi-
nancial firms that do business in the United States.
In connection with its initial proposal of the Regulation K Revi-
sions, the Board expressed concern that increasing foreign merger activ-
ity might increasingly cause a foreign banking organization that
otherwise met the QFBO test to fail to meet the QFBO test.63 For exam-
ple, a foreign banking organization with U.S. banking operations that
previously met the QFBO test might be acquired by a foreign non-life
insurance company, on which basis the foreign banking organization
might no longer satisfy the QFBO requirements. The QFBO test in-
cludes a wrinkle that makes this circumstance more likely to result in
disqualification as a QFBO than might otherwise be the case. It only
allows to be counted as foreign banking activity those activities con-
ducted by the foreign bank 64 or a subsidiary of the foreign bank.65 Thus,
if a foreign life insurance company acquires a foreign bank, even though
life insurance is added by the Regulation K Revisions to the Section
211.5(d) list,66 its life insurance business would not be included in foreign
61 The Regulation K Revisions have added certain life and other related insurance underwriting
to the list of permissible activities.
62 See, e.g., Zavvos, supra note 30, at 480-81.
63 Regulation K Proposed Revisions, supra note 4, at 96,684.
64 According to the definition provided in § 211.2(j) of Regulation K, which appears to be appli-
cable, "foreign bank" means a company organized abroad that engages in the business of banking; is
recognized as a bank by the bank supervisory or monetary authority of the country of its organiza-
tion or principal banking operations; receives deposits to a substantial extent in the regular course of
its business; and has the power to accept demand deposits. This definition is relatively regulo-cen-
tric, and could exclude companies that engage in activities outside the scope of banking as defined in
the U.S., but within the scope of banking as defined abroad. On the other hand, "foreign bank" as
defined in Section l(b)(7) of the International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3101(7) (1988) is a
much more accommodating concept. The latter definition refers to companies organized abroad that
engage in the business of banking, or any subsidiary thereof, including, "without limitation, foreign
commercial banks, foreign merchant banks and other foreign institutions that engage in banking
activities.. .in the countries where such foreign institutions are organized or operating" (emphasis
added). Such a definition would eviscerate § 211.23(c)(2).
65 Regulation K, supra note 4, § 211.23(c).
66 Regulation K, supra note 4, § 211.5(d)(16).
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banking business for purposes of the QFBO test. In fact, its life insur-
ance business would be included in non-banking activity for purposes of
the test. This structural bias in favor of holding businesses of the type
described in Section 211.5(d) of Regulation K within a foreign bank (as
restrictively defined in Regulation K), or in the bank's subsidiaries, ap-
pears relatively artificial, insofar as the outcome of the QFBO test may be
changed by moving appropriate operations into the bank chain of
ownership.
In response to what it refers to as possible undue hardship arising
from the strict application of the QFBO test,67 under the revised Regula-
tion K, the Board plans to grant exemptions, including prospective ex-
emptions, for failure to meet the QFBO test on a case-by-case basis.68 It
would exercise this discretion in order to prevent hardship to foreign
companies, considering whether the non-qualifying owner engages
predominantly in activities permissible to U.S. bank holding companies
abroad. This discretion would allow the Board to ameliorate the opera-
tion of Section 211.23(c)(2), which requires that non-banking operations
be conducted through or under the foreign bank, in order to help estab-
lish QFBO status.
Of course, a foreign banking organization that can qualify for this
type of discretionary exemption would be grateful for it. However, a
change that the Board declined to make would have diminished the need
for discretionary exemptions without sacrificing important policies. This
change would allow all operations of the foreign banking organization to
be considered in determining whether QFBO status is available. This
would simplify and rationalize the regulatory standard. However, this
revision would not eliminate the problem of a unilateral, regulo-centric
approach to the operations of foreign banking organizations outside the
United States.
C. The Relationship Between Regulation K and the
Second Banking Directive
1. The Second Banking Directive
The Second Banking Directive is central to the recent European
Community legislation to liberalize financial services, both geographi-
cally within the European Community and functionally, helping to cre-
ate the single market in this service sector.6 9 Even more importantly,
67 See Regulation K Proposed Revisions, supra note 4, at 96,700.
68 Regulation K, supra note 4, § 211.23(e).
69 The preamble to the Second Banking Directive calls it "the essential instrument for the
achievement of the internal market, a course determined by the Single European Act and set out in
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this liberalization is expected to be a major factor in the implementation
of the free movement of capital. It is based on the principle of integra-
tion through the blended approach of minimal or "essential" harmoniza-
tion of necessary regulations, and mutual recognition of home country
licensing and supervision.7" This section will briefly describe the Second
Banking Directive and explain its approach to extraterritoriality and rec-
iprocity and will then proceed to examine the interaction of Regulation
K and the Second Banking Directive. This examination has a two-fold
purpose: first, to understand the approach to harmonization taken
within the European Community, aided by an institutional and constitu-
tional infrastructure that enables enhanced cooperation toward harmoni-
zation; and second, to understand the approach taken by the Second
Banking Directive to third country banks. Thus we look at the European
Community as a multinational organization from an internal perspective,
and as a unitary entity from an external perspective.
The mechanics of the Second Banking Directive are relatively sim-
ple. Credit institutions that are authorized to engage in business in one
member state are entitled to engage in authorized businesses71 in all other
member states of the European Community, both through interstate
branching and through cross-border services. No local authorization or
local capital may be required by the other member states: this is the
"single banking license".
The principle of integration followed by the Second Banking Direc-
tive--essential harmonization and mutual recognition-is the corner-
stone of the integrative thrust under the Single European Act of 1986.72
This principle has been found more effective in terms of legislative pro-
ductivity than the more difficult approach of complete harmonization. It
also has obvious advantages over mere mutual recognition in terms of
regulatory effectiveness: it allows some commonly agreed regulatory
goals to be achieved uniformly and transnationally, instead of relying
timetable form in the Commission's White Paper, from the point of view of both the freedom of
establishment and the freedom to provide financial services, in the field of credit institutions." Sec-
ond Banking Directive, supra note 30.
70 See Zavvos, supra note 30, at 470-76. The two main pure approaches to integration are (i)
agreeing on private international law rules to determine which country's law will govern a particular
person, circumstance or transaction, and (ii) unifying laws so that each country's law is the same as
each other country's law, making it unimportant which country's law governs.
71 The permitted activities are listed in the annex to the Second Banking Directive, supra note
30, and include a wide range of activities, including deposit-taking, lending, leasing, credit cards,
foreign exchange trading, futures and options trading, securities trading, underwriting, investment
banking advice, etc. They do not include insurance.





solely on the vagaries of national regulation, as influenced by competition
in regulatory laxity.
The Second Banking Directive's common regulatory standards in-
clude (i) minimum capital73 of five million ECU (with possible excep-
tions);7 4 (ii) restrictions on participation in non-credit or non-financial
institutions;7" (iii) supervisory control over major shareholders;7 6 and (iv)
requirements for "sound administrative and accounting procedures and
adequate internal control mechanisms." 7 7
However, despite the ability to achieve commonly agreed regulatory
goals, this approach otherwise has a qualified deregulatory thrust. The
deregulatory thrust arises from the fact that national regulatory burdens
imposed in excess of the commonly agreed minimum standards may act
as a competitive disadvantage to national competitors, resulting in a
competitive national regulatory "race for the bottom" or "competition in
regulatory laxity". This phenomenon is qualified by the fact that na-
tional regulation that enhances the competitive position of national com-
petitors, such as regulation, surveillance and enforcement that makes
them more attractive depositories at a cost to them less than the profit
they can earn on the resulting increased business, would provide compet-
itive benefits to the regulated persons. Subject to this qualification, the
Second Banking Directive may result in progressive reduction of national
regulation to the extent that it exceeds the standards set in the Second
Banking Directive.
2. The Reciprocity Requirement of the Second Banking Directive
The Second Banking Directive is a market-opening initiative, result-
ing in extreme liberalization of geographic restrictions on banking serv-
ices within the European Community. As with other European
Community market-opening initiatives, the question arises whether the
European Community will allow non-Community competitors to enjoy
the benefits of the liberalization.78 The European Community has not
73 As defined in the Own Funds Directive, supra note 30.
74 Second Banking Directive, supra note 30, at art. 4.
75 Id. at art. 12.
76 Id. at art. 11.
77 Id. at art. 13.
78 The Second Banking Directive does not change the basic regime with respect to branches of
foreign banks, which is governed by the First Banking Directive, First Council Directive of 12 De-
cember 1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the
Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 322) 30
(1977) (Council Directive 77/780/EEC) [hereinafter First Banking Directive]. Articles 4 and 9 of
the First Banking Directive permit member states to require foreign banks to obtain a license before
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been altogether consistent on this issue,7 9 but has often sought a quid pro
quo-some form of reciprocity-in exchange for third country access.8 0
The Second Banking Directive is no different, as it imposes a requirement
for reciprocity by the home country of a foreign parent company, in or-
der for a European Community subsidiary of that foreign parent com-
pany to be permitted the benefits of the Second Banking Directive.
What does "reciprocity" mean? This is a critical issue, and caused a
good deal of concern in the United States when the Second Banking Di-
rective was first proposed."1 The two poles are between (i) reciprocal
national treatment, whereby foreign persons are required to be treated
precisely the same as domestic persons, and (ii) so-called "mirror image"
reciprocity, whereby a foreign person is permitted to do the same things
in the host country as host country nationals are permitted to do in the
territory of the foreign person's home country. Reciprocal national
treatment requires no territorial regulatory concessions, other than with
respect to vestigial access regulation, and is therefore an easier standard
for the United States or Japan to meet. It does not entail making excep-
tions to the domestic application of restrictive rules like the separation of
commercial and investment banking, or, in the United States, the separa-
tion of banking from commerce and limitations on interstate banking.
establishing a branch. The 19th "whereas" clause of the Second Banking Directive specifies that the
First Banking Directive will continue to govern in this regard.
79 Article 58 of the Treaty of Rome mandates the right of establishment throughout the Com-
munity for firms incorporated under the laws of member states. It does not specifically discriminate
against such firms the shareholders of which happen to be third-country corporations or nationals,
and the European Commission generally applies article 58 to all firms formed under the law of a
member state. However, the right of first establishment-of forming a firm under member state law
or purchasing one-is potentially restricted for third-country corporations or nationals, under sec-
tor-specific regimes like the Second Banking Directive. Rome, Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11g.
80 Third-country firms and governments have expressed concern about whether the creation of
the internal market for the European Community involves the creation of a "Fortress Europe"
against third-country trade. In 1988, the Commission explained that, while it expected trade-crea-
tion effects to benefit third countries, and while it would comply with its GATT and other trade
obligations, it would "not unilaterally extend the benefits of internal liberalization to third countries.
Instead, the EC will seek comparable liberalization on the part of its major trading partners." Com-
mission of the European Communities, "Europe 1992-Europe World Partner," European Commu-
nity News Release 28188 (EC Office of Press and Public Affairs, Oct. 19, 1988).
81 Proposal for a Second Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Admin-
istrative Provisions Relating to the Taking-Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and
Amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 84) art. 7 at 1 (1988) (Commission
Notice No. 88/C 84/01) [hereinafter Proposed Directive]. See Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second
Banking Directive of the European Economic Community and Its Importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 205 (1989), and Gruson, The Second European Banking Directive, 5 REV.




While the International Banking Act of 197882 incorporated the concept
of national treatment, there are questions regarding the extent to which
restrictions such as the QFBO standard discussed above8 3 undermine the
principle of national treatment for European Community banking orga-
nizations in the United States.84
Mirror image reciprocity, on the other hand, may be viewed as a
variation on 19th century concepts of "extraterritoriality," under which
foreign nationals remain subject to their home country's law, and are
protected from the operation of their host country's law, despite their
physical presence in the host country. 5 It would in practice require the
United States to become a party to the Second Banking Directive. It
would require the United States to permit European Community banking
organizations to engage within the U.S. in the full range of activities per-
mitted to U.S. banking organizations operating in the European Commu-
nity under the Second Banking Directive. If the U.S. did so without
liberalizing the rules applicable to U.S. banking organizations in the
U.S., it would provide significant competitive advantages to European
Community banking organizations in their U.S. operations: better-than-
national treatment. U.S. banks would obviously find this unacceptable
for competitive reasons, and U.S. regulators would find some of their
most dearly-held principles, as well as the principles they would like to
abandon, violated by the foreign entrants.
The Proposed Directive specified neither national treatment nor
mirror image reciprocity, but did provide a requirement for reciprocity.
If the Commission found that reciprocity was not available in the home
country of a non-European Community person seeking to establish a
banking subsidiary in the European Community, it could suspend its ap-
plication.86 The ambiguity of this provision, and its possible offensive
use, caused concern in the United States. The provision was amended in
82 12 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq. (1988).
83 See text accompanying notes 57-68, supra.
84 For a list of potential exceptions to national treatment, see U.S. General Accounting Office,
International Finance: Competitive Concerns of Foreign Financial Firms in Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States 21-25 (1988). See also the Schumer Amendment under the Omni-
bus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5341-5342 (1988), which requires that the
Board determine whether U.S. firms are granted the same competitive opportunities as domestic
firms in the home country of a firm seeking or holding primary dealer status for U.S. government
securities.
85 Extraterritoriality in this sense is the mostly past practice of Western countries negotiating
treaties with former colonies or other Asian or Middle Eastern countries whereby the Western coun-
try's nationals would be exempt from local law. See Bederman, Extraterritorial Domicile and the
Constitution, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 451 (1988).
86 Proposed Directive, supra note 81, at art. 7(6).
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order to respond to these concerns, but the ground for concern has not
been completely eliminated.
The Second Banking Directive incorporates both concepts of reci-
procity, providing for different potential European Community reactions
depending on the type of reciprocity that is found to be denied by the
relevant third country.
Under Article 9(3), if "effective market access comparable to that
granted by the Community to credit institutions from that third coun-
try"-a flexible mirror image reciprocity standard-is denied, the Euro-
pean Commission may merely request of the Council a mandate to
negotiate with that third country for "comparable competitive opportu-
nities."8 7 While this process may be effective, and may carry with it the
implicit threat of retaliation should negotiations break down, it is not as
threatening as the process to be invoked if the Commission finds that
national treatment is denied. This process might be invoked, for example
to call for interstate banking rights in the United States to be accorded to
Community credit institutions.
Under Article 9(4), if national treatment offering the same competi-
tive opportunities as those available to domestic credit institutions is denied
to European Community banking organizations, and the conditions of
effective market access are not fulfilled, the Commission may initiate ne-
gotiations and suspend applications for permission from corporations
formed under the laws of the offending country to establish banking sub-
sidiaries in the European Community. 8 The first part of this trigger is a
national treatment standard, assuming that "domestic credit institu-
tions" refers only to U.S. banks, and not to banks plus other financial
services firms. If the earlier italicized language adds anything to the na-
tional treatment standard-and one must assume that it is intended to-
it means that de facto exclusion or limitation of European Community
banking organizations, for example, because they generally fail to meet
the QFBO test, is unacceptable. The additional prong relating to the
conditions of effective market access appears to refer back to Article 9(3),
with its call for comparable market access. Apparently, even if national
treatment is not offered, if comparable market access is offered, the sanc-
tions under Article 9(4) will not apply. In short, Article 9(3) contains a
mirror image reciprocity standard, while Article 9(4) refers to national
treatment.
Based on the current regulatory structure in the United States, it is
possible that the national treatment standard of Article 9(4) could be
87 Second Banking Directive, supra note 30, at art. 9(3).
88 Second Banking Directive, supra note 30, at art. 9(4).
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invoked, with the application of significant sanctions against the U.S.,
although Japan may be the more likely target. While U.S. commentators
have expressed a degree of satisfaction with the final reciprocity provi-
sions of the Second Banking Directive, 9 it is clear that the U.S. will
continue to be subject to pressure from the European Community to re-
duce some of its regulatory constraints that affect European Community
banking organizations seeking to operate in the United States.9'
3. Interaction Between Regulation K and the Second
Banking Directive
Let us now return to Regulation K, the U.S. unilateral administra-
tive moderation of the extraterritorial application of the BHC Act. It
moderates such application both from the standpoint of U.S. banking
organizations operating abroad, and from the standpoint of foreign bank-
ing organizations operating in the United States. While these aspects of
Regulation K are nominally separate, they are linked by certain con-
cepts, and, in a sense, by the Second Banking Directive itself. Together,
Regulation K and the Second Banking Directive form a regulatory echo
chamber that creates opportunities for interesting reverberations.
First, consider how Regulation K affects the determination of na-
tional treatment to European Community firms operating in the United
States. The QFBO standard of Section 211.23 of Regulation K operates
as an access limitation on the ability of European Community firms to
engage in banking business within the United States.91 Does this limita-
tion prejudice national treatment? From the U.S. perspective, it may
not, as it merely provides a special exemption to foreigners from some of
the normally applicable restrictions under the BHC Act: the U.S. might
argue that this is "better-than-national treatment."
From a foreign perspective, however, it may be viewed as imposing
defacto barriers to European Community credit institutions. These bar-
riers might indicate that the United States fails to offer "national treat-
ment offering the same competitive opportunities as are available to
domestic credit institutions", also failing to fulfill "the conditions of ef-
fective market access" within the meaning of Article 9(4) of the Second
Banking Directive. From this perspective, European Community firms
are denied access because of their use of their greater powers abroad, a
use which is both permitted by their home countries and necessitated by
89 Gruson, The Second European Banking Directive, 5 REv. BANKING & FIN. SERV. 159, 167
(erroneously dated September 13, 1989, but actually published Spring 1990).
90 See Zawos, supra note 30, at n. 203.
91 See text accompanying notes 57-68, supra.
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competition abroad. Will the European Community allow the United
States to require European Community firms to abide by U.S. regulatory
restrictions in Europe in order to maintain access to the United States, or
will the U.S. accept the more liberal European Community regime? It is
useful to refer to the regulatory purpose sought to be served by the
QFBO standard.
One purpose of the QFBO standard is to prohibit access to the U.S.
banking market by firms that engage in businesses held by our regulatory
principles to pose excessive risk.92 However, the United States has
shown an increasing willingness to compromise these regulatory princi-
ples, both domestically and in connection with the operations of U.S.
firms abroad. It may be difficult for the European Community to under-
stand why the United States holds the line as applied to the foreign activ-
ities of foreign firms, when it is liberalizing for the foreign activities of
domestic firms.
A second purpose of the QFBO standard is to provide a level play-
ing field within the United States, so that foreign firms that make use of
wider powers and activities abroad are prevented from competing within
the United States. This latter reason may raise concerns from the foreign
standpoint, as it levels the playing field extraterritorially in order to level
the playing field domestically. That is, it not only limits the activities of
European Community firms in the United States, but also limits the ac-
tivities of European Community firms abroad. Thus, considering both
purposes of the QFBO standard, the European Community might find it
difficult to agree that de jure better-than-national treatment does not
amount to de facto less-than-national treatment.
Second, consider how Regulation K affects the determination of
whether European Community firms are accorded "effective market ac-
cess comparable to that granted by the Community" to U.S. banking
organizations, within Article 9(3) of the Second Banking Directive. Reg-
ulation K allows U.S. banking organizations to engage in a wider range
of activities in the European Community than would be permitted within
the United States, including limited equity securities underwriting and
dealing, certain lease financing and certain insurance activities. 93 All
these activities (other than possibly insurance) and more would be per-
mitted under the Second Banking Directive, assuming the subsidiary is
92 It should be noted that the relative magnitude of risk posed by the securities business, or other
businesses divorced from commercial banking in the U.S., is difficult to quantify empirically. In
addition, it might be argued that a portfolio of financial service businesses, including commercial
banking and investment banking, as well as others, would be less volatile than a single one of these
businesses alone. More importantly, of course, the risk of any business depends on how it is done.
93 Regulation K, supra note 4, at § 211.5(d).
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first admitted to a member state of the European Community.94 How-
ever, European banking organizations operating in the United States
would not be permitted to engage in these activities to the same extent as
they are permitted to in Europe. One response to this phenomenon is
that it does not raise problems, but is the nature of the world. Mere
difference of national law, with no protectionist motivation, does not
prejudice effective market access in unacceptable ways.
However, a different perspective might consider that the United
States was failing to provide European Community firms with access to
U.S. markets comparable to the access that the European Community
provides to U.S. firms. There are two bases for this perspective. First,
European Community firms would not be permitted to engage in the
United States in the full range of services that U.S. firms are permitted to
perform in Europe. This is merely because Europe has a more liberal
internal regime than the outmoded U.S. regulatory regime, but it results
in greater market access to U.S. firms in Europe than that accorded Eu-
ropean firms in the United States. Second, U.S. firms are not disadvan-
taged in terms of their access to the European Community market on the
basis of a regulatory restriction that would limit their activities in the
United States, whereas the QFBO standard has this extraterritorial effect
on European Community firms seeking access to the U.S. banking
market.
Finally, although they do not arise under Regulation K, we should
consider here the effects of restrictions on interstate banking in the
United States. These restrictions limit the access of European Commu-
nity firms to the U.S. national banking market, while under the Second
Banking Directive and under general European Community law,95 the
goal and effect is to achieve a single, Community-wide market. They
might be viewed as inconsistent with access comparable to that provided
in the European Community to U.S. firms, raising issues under Article
9(3) of the Second Banking Directive.
Thus, if the European Community persists in criticizing U.S. regula-
tion on the basis of its creation of defacto barriers, pressuring the United
States to engage with the Community in a process of reciprocal reduction
of barriers, it will be engaging in an external process that bears some
similarity to its internal process of essential harmonization and mutual
recognition. However, instead of essential harmonization in the sense of
establishing minimal regulatory standards, it engages with the United
94 Second Banking Directive, supra note 30, at annex.
95 See, e.g., the German Insurance Case, Commission v. Germany, Case 220/83, 2 COMMON
MKT. L.R. 69 (1987).
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States in harmonized reduction of regulatory standards, perhaps with the
implicit assumption or evaluation that U.S. regulatory standards are at a
high enough level. Instead of mutual recognition of U.S. banking
licenses, it allows U.S. banking firms to obtain Community banking
licenses. While the internal Community process and the external negoti-
ation with the United States are different, they have the same trade effect:
establishing a reasonably barrier-free market in financial services that in-
cludes the United States.
This conflict may be viewed in terms of prescriptive jurisdiction. In
these terms, the U.S. is seeking to apply its restrictive regime to Euro-
pean Community firms that operate in the United States, in connection
with their operations in Europe. The basis for U.S. prescriptive jurisdic-
tion over the European activities of these firms is their U.S. operations,
which may be analogized to U.S. residence, as well as the effects that
their activities have within the United States, both on their customers
and their competition. On the other hand, the European Community's
basis for prescriptive jurisdiction is nationality and residence, as well as
the effects their activities have within the Community, including the abil-
ity of the Community to establish globally competitive financial institu-
tions. Thus, overlapping jurisdiction is based on dual residence and
effects in both jurisdictions. Is there any way to divide up prescriptive
jurisdiction so that only a single financial institutional regulation regime
governs the operations of European financial conglomerates? Interna-
tional law provides no rules of decision to answer this question for us, so
we must look to the practical realities in order to determine whether an
allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction can be definitively negotiated. This
is the technical legal context of the trade negotiation. Within the Euro-
pean Community, the issue of prescriptive jurisdiction has been ad-
dressed as a trade issue. The United States has not yet fully viewed it this
way, but this perspective is changing.
D. Rule 15a-6 and the Broker-Dealer Concept Release
Like the QFBO provisions of Regulation K, Rule 15a-696 represents
a unilateral U.S. administrative approach to foreign financial institutions
operating in the United States. However, it is the product of a different
statutory context and regulatory process from the one that produced
96 Rule 15a-6 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (1988), was adopted in Exchange
Act Release No. 27,017, [1989 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 84,428 (July 11, 1989)
[hereinafter Rule 15a-6 Release]. At the same time, the Commission issued a broader "concept
release" on the topic, Recognition of Foreign Broker-Dealer Regulation, Exchange Act Release No.




Regulation K, as Regulation K in this context is the Board's interpreta-
tion and amplification of U.S. banking law, while Rule 15a-6 is the Com-
mission's effort to fill a void in U.S. securities law. It is even the product
of a different statutory context and regulatory process from Regulation S,
discussed below, 97 as it is a product of the Division of Market Regulation
of the Commission, which is concerned in this context with regulation of
broker-dealer professionals, while Regulation S is a product of the Divi-
sion of Corporate Finance of the Commission, which is concerned in this
context with requirements for timing and extent of disclosure by issuers
of securities. Rule 15a-6 deals with the question of the applicability of
U.S. broker-dealer registration requirements and regulation to foreign
persons. It was promulgated simultaneously with a broader "concept re-
lease" on mutual recognition of foreign broker-dealer regulation, which
will be discussed in greater detail below.
The regulatory purpose of the registration requirement is to protect
investors and to protect the integrity of the market by (i) establishing
qualification standards for broker-dealers and their personnel, (ii) estab-
lishing rules of conduct, antifraud standards and enforcement mecha-
nisms, (iii) establishing net capital requirements, and (iv) imposing
recordkeeping and reporting obligations.98 These protections are viewed
as critical to the maintenance of the integrity and efficiency of the U.S.
securities market. Despite the prudence of these rules, foreign broker-
dealers would generally prefer not to be subject to them. They entail
certain additional costs of doing business that these enterprises might not
otherwise choose to incur. An important example is the net capital rule99
applicable to U.S. broker-dealers, which requires that U.S. broker-dealers
maintain a certain level of assets, subject to volatility-based discounting,
97 See text accompanying notes 147-173, infra.
98 As pointed out by the Commission, many of these rules do not actually require broker-dealer
registration in order to apply to foreign broker-dealers. The Commission states that its staff would
not recommend enforcement action in case a foreign broker-dealer exempt from the registration
requirement under Rule 15a-6 fails to comply with other rules applicable to broker-dealers using the
jurisdictional means. Rule 15a-6 Release, supra note 96, n. 22 at 80,235. This position is curious,
insofar as it leaves foreign broker-dealers less than certain that they will not be subject to these
ancillary enforcement actions. A no-action position taken by the staff of the Commission is not
necessarily binding on the Commission itself, and more importantly, does not bind individuals who
may, or may not, have a private cause of action. This position is probably based on limitations of the
Commission's statutory rule-making authorization, which might be required to be increased in order
to exempt foreign broker-dealers from these other requirements. Of course, the Commission could
promulgate rules under § 30(b) of the Exchange Act, but may be reluctant to do so because such
rules would rehabilitate § 30(b), or because such rules would necessarily exempt foreign broker-
dealers from the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, a result that would be unacceptable to
the Commission.
99 Rule 153-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1990).
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in relation to their liabilities. The net capital rule may be compared to
the proposals contained in the European Community's proposed Capital
Adequacy Directive l"0 and to the proposals discussed in the forum of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
Rule 15a-6 was first proposed in 1988.101 It is intended to clarify or
to moderate the jurisdictional reach of Section 15(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,102 which specifies that any broker or dealer using
any means of interstate commerce 10 3 to sell securities must register with
the Commission. The Commission is authorized under Section 15(a)(2)
of the Exchange Act to conditionally or unconditionally exempt any bro-
ker or dealer from the registration requirements of Section 15(a).
The Rule 15a-6 Proposing Release describes the development of the
Commission's position on this issue, beginning with Release 4708."°
The staff of the Commission believes that "in contrast to the more expan-
sive scope of the antifraud provisions [Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule lob-5 thereunder], the U.S. broker-dealer registration require-
ments were not intended to protect foreign persons dealing with foreign
securities professionals outside the United States."' 15 Putting aside for a
moment the question of how the Commission divined Congress' intent so
specifically, according to this territorial approach, where foreign inves-
tors trade through foreign broker-dealers outside the United States, the
broker-dealer registration requirements should not be applied. In addi-
tion, where a foreign broker-dealer effects unsolicited trades for U.S. in-
100 Proposal for a Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institu-
tions, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 152) 6 (1990) (Commission Notice No. 90/c 152/06) [hereinafter
Capital Adequacy Directive]. At the date of writing of this article, agreement had not been reached
on the final form of an investment services directive. See Plans to Break ISD Deadlock Fail But
Solution May Lie With Markets, FIN. REG. REPT. (July 1991).
101 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,801, 41 SEC Docket 164 (June 14, 1988) [hereinafter
Rule 15a-6 Proposing Release].
102 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988).
103 Section 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1988), refers to the use of interstate commerce, and
Section 3(a)(17) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1988), defines "interstate commerce"
to include trade among the several states or between any foreign country and any state.
104 Securities Act Release No. 4,708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9,828 (July 9, 1964), codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 231 (1991) [hereinafter Release 4708]. Until the final adoption of Regulation S, Release 4708 was
the cornerstone of the U.S. regime for extraterritorial application of the registration requirements
under the Securities Act of 1933. In connection with its prescriptions for registration, it also covered
the circumstances under which foreign underwriters could participate in a U.S. distribution, without
being required to register as broker-dealers under U.S. law. Broadly, it provided that registration as
a broker-dealer would not be required for (i) offshore sales to non-U.S. persons, or (ii) sales into the
U.S. through a U.S.-registered broker-dealer.
105 Rule 15a-6 Proposing Release, supra note 101, at 171 (citations omitted). We will take up later




vestors, outside the United States, the registration requirements would
not apply. These positions are based on two rationales. First, the Com-
mission views the purpose of the relevant provisions of the Exchange Act
as principally to protect the integrity of the U.S. capital markets and to
protect U.S. investors. Second, the Commission supports its views by
appeals to comity and to the "legitimate expectations" of investors. 106
The Commission rejects the argument that Section 30(b) of the Ex-
change Act, 10 7 which excludes from the application of the Exchange Act
any person "insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States," would exempt foreign broker-deal-
ers. 108 The Commission has interpreted this provision quite narrowly,
arguing that "without the jurisdiction of the United States" does not
mean outside U.S. territory, but means outside the prescriptive jurisdic-
tion of the United States. Perhaps recognizing that this interpretation
obviates the need for the provision, and is therefore difficult to accept as a
matter of statutory construction, the Commission argues that even if ac-
tivities outside U.S. territory are immune from the restrictions of the Ex-
change Act, solicitations by a foreign broker-dealer of sales into the
United States would prevent the foreign broker-dealer from claiming that
he was remaining outside the territory of the United States. However,
this fall-back position is untenable, as it would appear to split up the
foreign broker-dealer for regulatory purposes: subject to U.S. registra-
tion requirements with respect to its U.S. business, but exempt "insofar
as" its business is outside the United States. While this is probably the
logical effect of a strict reading of Section 30(b), 109 it is not an adminis-
trable outcome, perhaps indicating in part why Congress in the latter
part of Section 30(b) called for the Commission to issue regulations ap-
plying the Exchange Act to certain persons even if they transact a busi-
ness in securities outside the United States. 110 The Commission
106 See, eg., Rule l5a-6 Proposing Release, supra note 101, at 172.
107 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1988).
108 Rule l5a-6 Proposing Release, supra note 101, at 171 n. 39.
109 For an analysis of § 30(b) and its legislative history, see Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign
Aspects of Securities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REv. 1015 (1969). See also Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27,
32 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in which Judge Bork accepts § 30(b) as evidence that Congress did not intend
the Exchange Act to have application to purchases of securities by foreigners outside the United
States.
110 See Sachs, supra note 26. This article argues that the legislative history of the Exchange Act
evinces an absence of Congressional intent to protect traders whose trades occur outside the U.S.,
and that therefore Congress did not, as many courts and commentators have assumed or found, fail
to delineate the scope of extraterritorial application of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 under the Exchange
Act. Under the logic of the recent Boureslan case, 111 S. Ct. 1227, the absence of a clearly expressed
congressional intent to apply the law extraterritorially would preclude such application.
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explicitly rejects this outcome, stating that it uses an "entity approach",
which would subject an entire foreign firm to the registration require-
ments, even if only a small part of its business is effected within the
United States. 1 ' Section 30(b) may be viewed as an instance of explicit
Congressional delegation of discretion to apply U.S. law to foreign per-
sons. The Commission has not exercised this discretion, perhaps because
until recently it has found its regulatory goals better served by the widest
scope of potential application of the Exchange Act, perhaps also because
Section 30(b) does not distinguish, as the Commission does, between the
extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange
Act and the extraterritorial application of the other provisions of the Ex-
change Act.
Rule 15a-6 as adopted implements the territorial principle in a lim-
ited way, by providing an exemption from the broker-dealer registration
requirements of Section 15(a) for unsolicited securities transactions for
U.S. investors, and for solicited transactions with certain types of institu-
tional investors.
The exemption for unsolicited securities transactions is available
where the foreign broker-dealer does not contact or solicit the U.S. inves-
tor. "Solicitation" is undefined, but may include, for example, the provi-
sion of research reports to investors.
1 12
The exemption for transactions with institutional investors permits
transactions through a U.S.-registered broker-dealer, responsible for
compliance with U.S. securities laws. The Commission thought this con-
duit feature especially important in order to avoid a gap in the protection
afforded by the net capital rule, as well as to be able to apply other U.S.
regulation to the transaction and to ensure the availability of cooperation
with Commission enforcement actions. 113  The U.S.-registered broker-
dealer must participate in the solicitation, except for solicitations of insti-
tutional investors with over $100 million in assets. In addition, the for-
eign broker-dealer must agree to provide the Commission with
information and documents requested relating to transactions under this
exemption. This last requirement may be explained as a means of main-
taining regulatory effectiveness by maintaining the enforcement structure
that exists with respect to registered broker-dealers, where foreign bro-
111 Rule l5a-6 Release, supra note 96, at 80,237. This approach may be compared to the "waiver
by conduct" theory proposed in 1984 and apparently abandoned. Exchange Act Release No. 21,186
31 SEC Docket (CCH) 14 (July 30, 1984).
112 Rule 15a-6(a)(2) and (3) permit research reports to be provided by foreign broker-dealers to
institutional investors and for distribution by a registered U.S. broker-dealer, subject to certain
conditions.
113 See Rule l5a-6 Release, supra note 96, at 80,249.
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ker-dealers are permitted to operate without registering. It might also be
explained as an instance of the Commission requiring a concession of
extraterritorial enforcement power to which it may not be entitled. This
latter explanation is diminished in force by the fact that this requirement
relates only to the permission for direct solicitation within the United
States of institutional investors, rather than, for example, permission to
effect unsolicited transactions for U.S. persons. The touchstone of the
Commission's jurisdiction is territorial solicitation.
The problem with Rule 15a-6, and the Commission's general ap-
proach to international broker-dealer regulation, is that it asserts com-
plete jurisdiction over a broker-dealer, even if only a portion of its
transactions are solicited transactions with persons in the United States.
This approach erects a barrier to transnational commerce, insofar as it
does not accept that a single broker-dealer might wish to engage in busi-
ness in multiple jurisdictions, and might find it uneconomic to comply
with the regulatory requirements of each jurisdiction. For example,
where the United States seeks to ensure the financial soundness of its
brokerage systems through the net capital rule, which provides incentives
for holding certain types of assets, another jurisdiction might impose a
different rule that provides incentives for holding different types of assets.
The inconsistent and overlapping requirements could make transnational
business more costly than domestic business. An approach of mutual
recognition could resolve this problem.
The Commission's "entity" approach exemplifies the principal diffi-
culty in dividing up the world for purposes of prescriptive jurisdiction in
connection with institutional regulation of financial services organiza-
tions: it is difficult to divide up a single multinational financial services
organization for regulatory purposes. Therefore, each national regulator
sees the need to regulate the entire multinational organization, or per-
haps, as in the case of the scandal surrounding the Bank for Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI), a multinational organization may es-
cape effective regulation by any national regulator. This entity approach
in Rule 15a-6 is the same in terms of prescriptive jurisdiction as the ap-
proach of Regulation K to foreign banking organizations that do busi-
ness in the United States. Institutional regulation presents intractable
problems in this regard, which can only be solved by either a process
beginning with partial harmonization and expected to lead to more sub-
stantial harmonization, such as the Second Banking Directive, or a com-
plete harmonization in critical areas, such as the Basle Accord discussed
below.
The Broker-Dealer Concept Release is intended to explore the use of
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the concept of mutual recognition, as a means to defer to foreign regula-
tion of broker-dealers that also operate in the United States. The princi-
ple upon which it is based represents a departure from a generally regulo-
centric principle that U.S. regulation must apply to protect U.S. persons
and markets, and that foreign regulation would not be an adequate sub-
stitute. It purports to represent an exploration of the regulatory princi-
ple of the Second Banking Directive and the proposed Investment
Services Directive: essential harmonization and mutual recognition.1 14
The Commission recognizes the regulatory problem of mutual
recognition:
[T]he exclusion of foreign firms from U.S. regulatory requirements possibly
could result in risks for U.S. investors and markets if the foreign regulatory
system did not afford fundamental protections, or if the cross border activi-
ties of exempted broker-dealers were not adequately monitored by either
U.S. or foreign regulatory authorities. The Commission believes, however,
that a properly tailored approach recognizing foreign broker-dealer regula-
tion can accomplish its goal of maintaining effective regulation of such
cross border activities.1 15
The Commission proposal calls for the presence of all of the key
safeguards of U.S. broker-dealer regulation. The elements of the con-
cept, as described by the Commission, are as follows:
1. The foreign broker-dealer's business must be predominantly foreign.
This component invites comparison to Regulation K's QFBO test, which
has a similar requirement. 1 6 However, the test the Commission would ap-
ply would require that U.S.-related securities activities account for no more
than 10% of securities revenues.117 The Commission wishes to avoid pro-
viding incentives for U.S. broker-dealers to engage in regulatory arbitrage
by relocating offshore.
2. The foreign broker-dealer must not have a U.S. broker-dealer affiliate,
and must provide its services from outside the U.S. This latter prong may
be illusory, or worse, difficult to satisfy, as the important issue is whether
the foreign broker-dealer may make telephone calls to customers in the U.S.
Compare this restriction to the right under the Second Banking Directive
and the Investment Services Directive to either provide cross-border serv-
ices, or to exercise the right of establishment by branching. The Commis-
sion is concerned that if it allowed a foreign broker-dealer operating within
the U.S. to be exempted from U.S. regulation in deference to home country
114 This is not the first place where the U.S. has tried mutual recognition. For example, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission has established an exemption from its futures commission
merchants rules for foreign merchants that only transact business in futures traded on a foreign
board of trade, and who demonstrate that they are subject to a regulatory scheme comparable to that
of the CFTC. See Interpretive Statement with Respect to the Commission's Exemptive Authority
Under § 30.10 of Its Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 30, Appendix A.
115 Broker-Dealer Concept Release, supra note 96, at 80,261.
116 See text accompanying notes 57-68, supra.
117 Broker-Dealer Concept Release, supra note 96, at 80,263.
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regulation, the U.S. as a whole would be subject to competitive pressures to
reduce its aggregate level of regulation: the so-called competition in regula-
tory laxity that is part of the deregulatory thrust of the Single European
Act's approach to regulatory harmonization. It also supports this position
by citing a different issue: the difficulty that the home country regulator
would experience in regulating the foreign broker-dealer's U.S. operations,
which regulation is critical to the Commission's willingness to defer
thereto. 1 'Finally, with respect to the first prong of this requirement, it
expresses concern that if a foreign broker-dealer with an afliliate that is a
U.S.-registered broker-dealer is permitted to operate in the U.S. without
registration, the U.S.-registered broker dealer could evade certain U.S. reg-
ulatory requirements-principally the net capital rule-by booking business
through its unregulated foreign parent.
3. It must limit its U.S. broker-dealer activities to transactions with insti-
tutional investors with over $100 million in assets. This limitation signifi-
cantly limits the operation of this concept to investors expected to have
extremely high levels of sophistication, presumably those able to recognize,
evaluate and accept the differences in regulation. With greater experience,
the Commission would consider expanding the class of eligible investors.
119
4. The existence of memoranda of understanding or treaties with the for-
eign broker-dealer's home country regulator, in order to support the Com-
mission's reliance on the home country regulator as a substitute for its
regulation. The Commission is careful not to abdicate its role as guardian
of the U.S. public capital market, and thus wishes to ensure that its enforce-
ment abilities will not be hindered by the fact that its targets are located
abroad. It would require cooperation on both regulatory and enforcement
matters.
5. The Commission must be satisfied that the home country regulatory
regime is comparable to that of the U.S. This promises to involve difficult
judgments, as well as an implicit recognition that there are aspects of our
regulatory system that are not necessary to achieve the fundamental goals
of broker-dealer regulation; this recognition may be difficult for the Com-
mission to make. The Commission sets forth in its own image the key ele-
ments of broker-dealer regulation: qualification and conduct standards,
financial responsibility standards, procedures for protection of customer
funds and securities, credit regulation, a sound clearance and settlement
system and a comprehensive monitoring and enforcement program.
1 20
6. Continued applicability to the foreign broker-dealer of certain U.S. reg-
ulatory requirements. This might be occasioned by a gap, from a U.S. regu-
latory perspective, in the foreign broker-dealer's home country regulatory
regime, in which case the Commission might fill the gap by applying a part
of the U.S. regulatory regime that might not otherwise be applicable.
118 The Basle Committee's revised Concordat established principles for the allocation of bank
regulatory responsibility between home state and host state including the principle of consolidated
supervision. Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices: Revised Basle Concordat
on Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 900
(1983).
119 Broker-Dealer Concept Release, supra note 96, at 80,263.
120 Broker-Dealer Concept Release, supra note 96, at 80,264.
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7. This exemption would not depend on reciprocal acceptance of U.S. bro-
ker-dealer regulation by the foreign broker-dealer's home country.1
21
The pattern of restrictions that the Commission has seen fit to im-
pose in order to liberalize access to U.S. markets for foreign broker-deal-
ers, while seeking to maintain the integrity and coherence of its
regulation, is evidence of the difficulty of accomplishing both goals simul-
taneously without high levels of international harmonization and cooper-
ation. The Commission has been motivated by the goal of increasing the
access of U.S. institutional investors to foreign markets, but has been
reluctant to compromise any part of the spectrum of protections applica-
ble to protect U.S. investors against self-dealing and other abuse by bro-
ker-dealers.
E. Comparison of Rule 15a-6 to Regulation K
Rule 15a-6 is a more limited approach to foreign financial institu-
tions than the QFBO provisions of Regulation K, because it deals with
foreign broker-dealers that by definition are not established in the United
States. However, its approach is similar to that of Regulation K, insofar
as it makes only limited regulatory concessions in order to reduce the
extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act's registration require-
ment. Like Regulation K, it is based on a dual assumption that (i) the
foreign regulatory system either cannot be evaluated or cannot be ac-
cepted as sufficient to protect U.S. regulatory interests, and (ii) it is
costless to impose an additional layer of regulation on foreign financial
institutions. The Broker-Dealer Concept Release would change the first
assumption, calling for an evaluation of foreign regulatory systems. The
next step would be to accept that it is not costless to impose an additional
layer of regulation on foreign financial institutions, and on this basis to
adopt a regime of mutual recognition based on essential harmonization.
It is not costless for two reasons. First, it is a barrier to the free flow of
capital and to trade in financial services that reduces overall efficiency.
Second, other countries will view it not as a mere difference in regulatory
taste, but as implicit protectionism, and will retaliate. These costs must
be fully recognized and evaluated in the Commission's regulatory deci-
sion-making.
Rule 15a-6 is an instance of unilateral action to regulate transna-
tional broker-dealers. Because it is unilateral, it must assume the worst
about foreign regulatory regimes; it must protect against the worst for-
eign regulatory regimes, even when the foreign broker-dealer involved is
121 The Riegle-Garn Bill, infra note 127, if enacted, might change this approach, or form the
basis for the Commission's decision to change this approach.
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regulated by a strong foreign regulatory regime. Thus, it imposes costs
inaccurately, for example, by requiring that foreign broker-dealers do
business with U.S. institutional investors through U.S.-registered broker-
dealers. This requirement adds to the costs involved in the transaction,
because the U.S.-registered broker-dealer must be compensated to absorb
the risks that this feature of the rule intends it to absorb. By adding to
the costs of the transaction in this way, the Commission is imposing a
regulatory barrier to effective competition by foreign broker-dealers.
While the costs of this regulatory barrier may be justified in cases where
the foreign broker-dealer is not subject to an adequate regulatory regime,
the indiscriminate imposition of these costs in situations where the for-
eign broker-dealer may be subject to an adequate foreign regulatory re-
gime cannot be so justified.
F. Comparison of Rule 15a-6 to the European Commission's Draft
Investment Services Directive
The European Community recognizes that variations and overlaps
of regulation diminish the efficiency of their internal market in capital
and in financial services, and are moving forward internally on the basis
of mutual recognition based on essential harmonization. The objectives
of this process are to remove barriers to the free flow of capital and finan-
cial services, and to remove opportunities for hidden protectionism that
raise possibilities for retaliation.
In 1990, the European Commission submitted to the Council of
Ministers an amended proposal on investment services in the securities
field. 22 The Investment Services Directive is currently under discussion
in the Council. Its final agreement is subject to agreement on standards
for capital adequacy for investment firms, under the proposed Capital
Adequacy Directive discussed below. 23 It is also subject to agreement
on whether off-exchange trading will be permitted, or whether alterna-
tively, formal exchanges will have a monopoly on trading, and other
issues. 
24
The Investment Services Directive is modelled on the Second Bank-
ing Directive, and would generally provide a similar single-license re-
122 Investment Services Directive, supra note 31. The investment services coming within the scope
of the directive are brokerage of securities, money market instruments, financial futures and options
and exchange rate and interest rate instruments, dealing of such instruments, underwriting of securi-
ties, market-making, portfolio management, investment advice and safekeeping of instruments.
123 See text accompanying notes 125 - 126, infra.
124 See Waters, Securities Firms Look Across Borders, Fin. Times, Jan. 7, 1991, at 4 (indicating
that large banks are favored by off-exchange trading, which allows them to internalize trading, ex-
cluding smaller firms).
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gime, with essential harmonization, home country regulation and host
country mutual recognition, in the non-bank investment firm context.
This is critical from the competitive standpoint of non-bank investment
firms, which will compete with universal banks that are free to exercise a
wide array of powers, and more importantly, that are free to operate
throughout the European Community under the Second Banking
Directive.
The pattern of regulation is similar to that under the Second Bank-
ing Directive, with essential harmonization of home state regulation in
similar respects, allowing cross-border branching or provision of services
one month after notification to the host state. The essential harmoniza-
tion requires home states to mandate (i) sufficient initial capital under the
Capital Adequacy Directive; (ii) suitable experienced managers and suit-
able shareholders holding stakes of 10% or more; (iii) sound administra-
tive, accounting, record-keeping and internal control mechanisms; (iv)
segregation of customers' cash and securities; (v) participation in a col-
lective compensation scheme to protect customers in the event of the in-
vestment firm's bankruptcy (for branches, this will be effected under the
compensation schemes in force in the host state, pending harmonization
of these arrangements); (vi) quarterly financial reporting to home state
authorities and (vii) organization in a manner that avoids harm to cus-
tomers from conflicts of interest. This regulation is in the exclusive juris-
diction of the home state.125 These rules do not define capital adequacy
standards, which will also be the responsibility of the firm's home state
and which will be covered in the separate Capital Adequacy Directive.
Host states will not be permitted to require local endowment capital.
126
As with the Second Banking Directive, the Investment Services Di-
rective contains provisions on reciprocity with non-member states, as a
basis for extending the market-opening benefits of the Investment Serv-
ices Directive to firms based in non-member states. The reciprocity pro-
visions contained in the Investment Services Directive are substantially
identical to those contained in the Second Banking Directive. Obviously,
the European Community decided to continue to use a formula that has
proven acceptable to the outside world. This formula appears to be at-
tractive to the United States as well.
Thus, the approach of the Investment Services Directive is more like
the mutual recognition approach of the Broker-Dealer Concept Release
than the limited exclusion approach of Rule 15a-6. The Investment Serv-
ices Directive begins with multilaterally agreed essential harmonization
125 Investment Services Directive, supra note 31, at art. 11.
126 Investment Services Directive, supra note 31, at art. 12(2).
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in several areas that the Commission has stated are important for evalu-
ating foreign home country regulation under the Broker-Dealer Concept
Release.
G. The Riegle-Garn Bill
The United States has under its federal law, since 1978, generally
accorded national treatment to foreign banks operating here. This treat-
ment has not been predicated on reciprocation by the home country of
the foreign bank. In response to perceptions of increasing international
competitive challenge to the United States in financial services, as well as
to the reciprocity provisions of the Second Banking Directive, Senators
Riegle and Garn introduced in January, 1990, a proposed bill entitled the
Fair Trade in Financial Services Act of 1990.127 The Bush Administra-
tion neither supports nor opposes the Riegle-Garn Bill, although the
Board opposes it on the ground that it may precipitate retaliation against
U.S. banks. 2 ' It would add a requirement of reciprocity by the foreign
bank's home country as a requirement for certain aspects of national
treatment under U.S. financial services regulation.129 Like the similar
requirements in the Second Banking Directive, this weapon is advertised
as offensive, rather than defensive; that is, it is intended to be used as a
crowbar to open foreign markets, such as Japan's, rather than to close
U.S. markets to foreigners. 130 It is a response, in part, to perceptions of
trade distortion resulting from regulatory subsidies to national competi-
tors in other markets.
The Riegle-Garn Bill begins by requiring annual reports by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury identifying those countries that do not accord na-
tional treatment to U.S. banks and describing the results of negotiations
which the Secretary of the Treasury is required to initiate seeking na-
127 Fair Trade in Financial Services Act of 1990, S.2028, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Cong. Rec. S. 476
(daily ed. Jan. 29, 1990). See also Senate Report No. 101-367 on S. 2028 as Reported by the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. At the time this article was written, the latest
version of the bill appeared as part of the proposed Defense Production Act Extension and Amend-
ments of 1991, H.R. 991, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (March 11, 1991) [hereinafter the Riegle-Garn Bill].
The Riegle-Garn Bill would amend, inter alia, the International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.
§ 3101 et seq. (1988) and the Exchange Act.
128 USTR Requests Changes in Financial Services Fair Trade Bill, Treasury Drops Opposition, 8
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 664 (May 1, 1991). The Bush administration had earlier threatened to
veto the bill. Riddell, Veto of US Banking Rules Retaliation Bill Threatened, Fin. Times, Feb. 22,
1991, at 3.
129 In this sense, it follows the Schumer Amendment under the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5341-5342 (1988), which requires that the Board determine whether
U.S. firms are granted the same competitive opportunities as domestic firms in the home country of a
firm seeking or holding primary dealer status for U.S. government securities.
130 Riegle-Garn Bill, supra note 127, at § 202.
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tional treatment. National treatment is defined as offering U.S. banks
"the same competitive opportunities (including effective market access)
as are available to its domestic banks and bank holding companies." 131
This standard appears comparable to the standard established in Article
9(4) of the Second Banking Directive, but does not provide the possibility
that differing competitive opportunities from those afforded to host coun-
try nationals might still constitute effective market access, thereby not
triggering sanctions.
The federal banking agencies are provided discretion, in consulta-
tion with the Secretary of the Treasury, to deny any application or disap-
prove any notice filed by a person of a foreign country132 specified by the
Secretary of the Treasury as failing to accord national treatment. These
sanctions are intended to freeze the level of business activity, both func-
tionally and geographically, of foreign banking organizations to the ex-
tent that existing U.S. regulations would require applications or notices
to be submitted to any of the federal banking agencies. However, the
federal banking agencies, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, are required to consider U.S. international agreements governing fi-
nancial services. In addition, they are mandated to consider with respect
to foreign firms already operating in the United States the record of the
foreign country in according national treatment to U.S. banks, and the
nature of the sanctions that the foreign country would impose on U.S.
banks for a failure of reciprocal national treatment by the United States.
This requirement has been added to alleviate specific concerns that the
sanctions available under the Riegle-Garn Bill were harsher than those
available under the Second Banking Directive.133 However, the Euro-
pean Community is still concerned that, unlike the Second Banking Di-
rective, the Riegle-Garn Bill would provide the potential for attacks
upon Community firms already doing business in the United States. 134
The Riegle-Garn Bill would extend this reciprocal national treat-
131 Id.
132 A person of a foreign country is any person organized under the foreign country's laws, any
person that has its principal place of business in that country, any citizen or domiciliary of that
country, or any person directly or indirectly controlled by any of the above. Riegle-Garn Bill, supra
note 127, at § 202.
133 See, eag., Gruson, Reciprocal National Treatment: Comparing EC Plan to Riegle-Garn Bill,
9(7) BANKING EXPANSION REP. 2 (Apr. 2, 1990) (pointing out that the initial version of the Riegle-
Garn Bill is harsher than the Second Banking Directive insofar as (i) the possibilities for retaliation
under the Second Banking Directive are limited to denying new applications for entry, rather than
halting the expansion of existing entrants, (ii) the Second Banking Directive has a three-month "sun-
set" provision, and (iii) the Second Banking Directive effectively "grandfathers" existing foreign
banking organizations).
134 USTR Requests Changes in Financial Services Fair Trade Bill, Treasury Drops Opposition, 8




ment regime to foreign securities brokers and dealers, with some
changes. The sanctions available, because broker-dealers generally do
not need to apply or provide notices for new business, are simply denying
foreign broker-dealers from offending countries the right to register as
broker-dealers with the Commission, thereby excluding them from the
U.S. market, or denying persons from such countries the right to acquire
U.S. broker-dealers.
135
The Riegle-Garn Bill represents a resurgence of protectionism--of
access regulation-in a somewhat more productive form. It is a unilat-
eral crowbar, providing restrictions on access in response to perceptions
of foreign restrictions on access. In this sense, it is subject to the same
criticisms that are levelled at unilateralism in trade generally: that it can
degenerate into unprincipled retaliation and protectionism, diminishing
aggregate welfare. 136 However, its suggestion is productive insofar as it
recognizes that regulatory subsidies exist, that they cause trade distor-
tions and that they diminish aggregate welfare. If these subsidies and
protections cannot be reduced on a multilateral basis, which would be
the optimal solution, it may make sense to seek their reduction unilater-
ally. In the next section, we consider a multilateral initiative that has
been successful in helping to level the international banking playing field.
III. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION CAPITAL: THE BASLE ACCORD
Capital regulation of financial institutions is intended to provide fi-
nancial resiliency to financial institutions, and also to provide a margin of
protection to customers. Requirements to maintain capital impose costs
on financial institutions, which costs vary with the cost of capital to that
financial institution. The amount of capital required of a financial insti-
tution should vary directly with the magnitude of the risks that it takes
and imposes on others through deposit insurance or otherwise. The risks
taken by a financial institution may be understood as a function of the
135 Riegle-Garn Bill, supra note 127, at § 403.
136 In testimony on April 5, 1990, before the House Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, Treasury Undersecretary Mulford described the administration's position on reciprocity:
The U.S. objection to even limited reciprocity has been the risk that reciprocity will be used and
that retaliation would follow. The impact could be devastating to confidence in world financial
markets and established patterns of monetary and capital flows. The President has clearly
stated his opposition to measures that might restrict the flow of capital or increase protection-
ism-the marketplace should be free to allocate resources.
National Treatment in Policy and Practice in the United States and Abroad, 1990: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervisions, Regulation and Insurance and the International
Competitiveness of US. Financial Institutions Task Force of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance,
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990) (Statement of David Mulford, Treasury Undersec-
retary). See also World Trade Survey, The Economist, Sept. 22-28, 1990, at 25-29, for a discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of the unilateral "crowbar" approach to international trade.
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type of business that it does, and the way that it does that business.
These risks may be evaluated using the types of principles of risk assess-
ment and underwriting applied by insurance companies in writing insur-
ance policies: by reference to the category of risk and by reference to the
loss experience of the particular insured.
The recent Treasury Report considers enhanced capital standards
and supervision as almost a universal solvent for banking ills, as a means
to insure against many of the risks in the system, or at least to make sure
that the controlling interests of the financial institution-the equity hold-
ers-have a significant stake in its losses, as well as in its gains.137 Thus,
regulation of capital cannot be considered in isolation from regulation of
institutional powers. On the other hand, capital represents a relatively
tangible and measurable criterion for financial institution resiliency, and
this quality, combined with its relatively unidimensional and universal
character, as well as its significant contribution to financial institution
costs, makes capital an attractive candidate for efforts at international
regulatory cooperation.
The Basle Accord"'8 has been hailed as one of the most important
events in recent times in the field of coordination of bank regulation. It
represents an informal but serious and binding (in the sense of moral and
reciprocal obligation, rather than in the legally enforceable sense) agree-
ment among the central bank governors of the Group of Ten139 to har-
monize capital adequacy requirements applicable to banks. It is different
from Regulation K and from the main thrust of the Second Banking
Directive, which deal largely with bank powers and supervision, insofar
as it deals with a single financial and relatively discrete component of
bank regulation. In fact, the Second Banking Directive is predicated
137 Treasury Report, supra note 19.
138 BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASURE-
MENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (July 1988) [hereinafter Basle Accord]. The Basle Accord is pro-
posed to be supplemented and amended. See BASLE SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE, CONSULTATIVE
PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STAN-
DARDS, 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 980 (1991). See generally Norton, The Work of the Basle
Supervisors Committee on Bank Capital Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on "International Con-
vergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards," 23 INT'L LAW. 245 (1989); Cooke, Inter-
national Convergence of Capital Adequacy Measurement and Standards, in FETSCrHRIFr FOR JACK
REVELL (Institute for European Finance, 1990); Hayward, Prospects for International Cooperation
by Bank Supervisors, 24 INT'L LAW. 787 (1990).
139 The Group of Ten is comprised of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland (which joined subsequent to the initial formation, making for 11
members) the U.K. and the U.S. The Group of Ten was formed in 1974 under the auspices of the
IMF. The group operates through each country's finance minister, but also has ad hoc committees,




upon the agreement on bank capital standards represented by the Basle
Accord, and established as law in the European Community under the
Own Funds Directive and Solvency Ratio Directive.
One important question about the Basle Accord involves its subject
matter: why was harmonization sought in capital adequacy, as opposed
to other topics of bank regulation? Capital adequacy standards have
emerged as a critical tool of bank regulation,140 allowing regulators to
effect two overlapping goals. First, as noted above, capital acts as a cush-
ion of solvency, adding to the resiliency of banking institutions: the more
capital a firm has (depending obviously on its cost of capital and its abil-
ity to service the cost of its capital), the more resilient it will be. In the
event of bankruptcy, capital is normally entitled to returns only after
debt, including deposits, has been fully paid. Second, capital acts as ear-
nest money for bank shareholders: it is their risk capital and commands
their diligence and prudence. The smaller the capital at stake in compar-
ison to the total funds of the bank, the greater the risks the shareholders,
who together exercise control over the bank (subject to bank regulation),
may be willing to take. Prudential bank regulation is intended to further
ameliorate the conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders
of banks, and of course, the government has a special concern as a con-
tingent involuntary debtholder of all banks that benefit from government
deposit insurance.
The Basle Accord was motivated by several factors. First, bank reg-
ulators were interested in enhancing banks' capital position, in order to
enhance banks' ability to absorb losses due to LDC debt and other expo-
sures. Second, they saw a need to forestall a possible competition in reg-
ulatory laxity in bank capital adequacy standards, whereby each country
would promote the competitive position of its banks by reducing its capi-
tal adequacy requirements, especially at a time when the regulators were
seeking capital increases."'
Far more difficult than establishing percentage requirements for
capital is the process of determining what is capital and in respect of
what assets capital is required. 42 The Basle Accord established optimis-
140 For a detailed dissection of the meaning and importance of capital requirements, see Norton,
Capital Adequacy Standards" A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Bank-
ing Activities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299 (1989).
141 Hayward, supra note 138, at 789.
142 One question that arose in the context of the negotiation of the Basle Accord is whether
certain hidden reserves held by Japanese banks comprised of the difference between the cost and the
appreciated market value of equity securities should be counted as capital. Such reserves represent
real value, but are subject to volatility, as demonstrated by the decline of the Japanese stock market
in 1990. In the case of these hidden reserves, a compromise was struck, applying a "haircut" to the
value of the reserves, with the intent that the haircut would represent a cushion against volatility. R.
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tically-labelled "risk-based" capital requirements which seek, in a gross
and limited fashion, to relate capital requirements to the relative riskiness
or volatility of specific categories of assets. It also established require-
ments for specific levels of capital, including Tier 1 Capital and Tier 2
Capital (which includes certain types of capital that may be more volatile
in value or may exhibit fewer of the characteristics of capital than Tier 1
Capital), as percentages of risk-weighted assets.'43
Much of the difficulty in negotiation centered around the financial
items that would be considered capital, and the way in which varying
types of assets would be "weighted" in terms of risk. The national varia-
tions in position on what should be considered capital reflected variations
in types of financial institutions, variations in financial practice and varia-
tions in regulatory approach. However, the variations in value and vola-
tility of different assets were relatively easy to measure and compare, and
therefore relatively easy to negotiate. They were relatively easy to mea-
sure and compare because financial assets are relatively fungible world-
wide, due to recent increases in financial arbitrage and transfer of
financial technology. In this context, where it is possible to be highly
analytical and where there is greater uniformity of practice, possibilities
for success in cooperation were greater than they would be with respect
to powers regulation and transaction regulation, where it is more difficult
to analyze the costs and benefits of regulation.
In the context of this single, but critical, parameter of institutional
bank regulation, within the historical context of the late 1980s, including
the impairment of money-center bank capital by the LDC debt crisis,
relatively wide informal multilateral harmonization has been accom-
plished. It is further expected that countries outside the Group of Ten
and the European Community will adopt the standards of the Basle
Accord. 144
The approach taken to capital in Rule 15a-6 stands in contrast to
the multilateral approach of the Basle Accord. For broker-dealers that
become subject to the U.S. registration requirements, the U.S. net capital
rule would apply in full, with no mutual recognition of the foreign bro-
ker-dealer's home capital requirements. IOSCO has made significant re-
cent progress toward harmonization of capital requirements for broker-
VERNON, D. SPAR & G. TOBIN, IRON TRIANGLES AND REVOLVING DOORS: CASES IN U.S. FOR-
EIGN ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING (1991).
143 The European Community followed the Basle Accord pursuant to the Own Funds Directive,
establishing the definition of capital, and the Solvency Ratio Directive, establishing a ratio of which
capital is the numerator and risk-weighted assets is the denominator. These achievements were a
prerequisite for the Second Banking Directive.




With extensive harmonization of capital requirements for banks
pursuant to the Basle Accord, mutual recognition for compliance with
this requirement is beside the point, except with respect to supervisory
responsibility: mutual recognition would indicate that the home country
regulator supervises compliance with the harmonized capital rules. With
this exception, there is a tradeoff between harmonization and mutual rec-
ognition: one can replace the other. In addition, as demonstrated by the
European Community, minimal or essential harmonization may be the
precondition for mutual recognition. Further, it may be expected that a
competition in reduction of regulatory cost spurred by mutual recogni-
tion would result in de facto harmonization.
Harmonization and mutual recognition are more difficult to the ex-
tent that the features sought to be harmonized or recognized vary in dif-
ferent societies, and are interwoven with other social and economic
policies or institutions. Capital requirements appear relatively easy to
disentangle and harmonize, but powers regulation or other institutional
regulation may be more deeply embedded, and therefore more difficult to
modify in connection with harmonization. As indicated above, one of
the main problems with institutional regulation is that the institution
often operates multinationally. How can the institution be cleaved in or-
der to allocate prescriptive jurisdiction among appropriate countries in a
way that will ensure neither overlap nor underlap of regulation? As we
will see in the next section, transactional regulation may allow prescrip-
tive jurisdiction to be allocated more efficiently, as transactional regula-
tion relates to smaller units: the transactions, rather than institutions
that may perform many transactions.
IV. TRANSACTION REGULATION: REGULATION S
Bank regulation generally focuses on institutions themselves, rather
than on transactions, 46 while the central focus of securities regulation is
transactional, and only secondarily focuses on the intermediary institu-
tions. While, as described above, securities broker-dealers are subject to
special regulation to ensure fidelity to customers' interests and to ensure
adequate capital, this regulation is secondary to public offering and sec-
ondary market disclosure regulation, which is transactional in nature.
145 Common Capital Standards Accord Emerging for Securities Industry, Thomson's Int'l Bank-
ing Regulator, Oct. 4, 1991, at 1.
146 Transaction regulation in banking is largely concerned with disclosure to consumers and
other forms of consumer protection. As consumers need little protection with respect to deposits
beyond federal deposit insurance, the focus of consumer protection is on consumers as borrowers.
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This transactional disclosure regulation is at the core of the idea of a
securities market, as it seeks to implement allocative efficiency by requir-
ing that investors be provided with adequate information in order to
make their investment decisions. In the United States, disclosure regula-
tion consists of three main features: (i) requirements for disclosure of
specific types of business and financial information; (ii) requirements for
filing with the Commission, or registration, in order to allow the Com-
mission to supervise disclosure; and (iii) antifraud provisions for civil and
criminal liability, including private rights of action.
The registration requirements contained in Section 5 of the Securi-
ties Act 47 support the disclosure principle by requiring issuers of securi-
ties to register their offerings with the Commission. This allows the
Commission to review or spot-check disclosure for compliance with dis-
closure requirements, and to compare disclosure of companies in the
same industry. The registration requirements are ancillary to disclosure.
A. Regulation S
Regulation S was intended to allow U.S. investors more easily to
provide financing in foreign capital markets, and to facilitate foreign se-
curities offerings by U.S. issuers. The process that led to the adoption of
Regulation S was also motivated, in part, by concerns, at least among
U.S. lawyers and investment bankers, regarding the erosion of the pre-
eminent international position of U.S. capital markets due to the increas-
ing competition of Tokyo and London.
On April 19, 1990, the Commission adopted Regulation S in order
to clarify the extraterritorial application of the registration provisions of
the Securities Act.148 By doing so, the Commission filled at least a sub-
stantial part of a serious gap in the specificity of the Securities Act.'4 9
The gap in the delineation of the extraterritorial application of both the
147 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1988).
148 Regulation S, supra note 9. Regulation S was finally adopted in Offshore Offers and Sales,
Securities Act Release No. 6863 [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 84,524
(April 24, 1990) [hereinafter Regulation S Release]. This release, and the two prior releases, initially
proposing Regulation S and modifying Regulation S prior to final adoption, are excellent sources of
background. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6838 [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 84,426 (July 11, 1989) (modifying original proposal) [hereinaf-
ter Regulation S Reproposing Release] and Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6779
[1987-1988 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 84,242 (June 10, 1988) (initial proposal)
[hereinafter Regulation S Initial Release]. See also Bloomenthal, The SEC and Internationalization
of Capital Markets: Herein of Regulation S and Rule 144,4 - Part II, 19 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
343 (1991).
149 The gap had been filled before by Release 4708, supra note 104, and by no-action letters and
market practice based thereon.
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registration provisions and the antifraud provision had been filled with
respect to the registration provisions by Release 4708 and practice there-
under, but with less clarity and economy.
Regulation S does not clarify the extent of the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the antifraud provisions, with the idea that it is inappropriate to
provide a "roadmap to fraud" and appropriate to provide some in ter-
rorem effect against potential fraud.15° This is probably an appropriate
perspective for an earnest and vigorous regulator; however, the problem
with this proviso is that the securities laws provide significant private
rights of action, as well as Commission antifraud enforcement powers,
pursuant to which an issuer that properly avoids the registration require-
ments under Regulation S might be held accountable for failing to meet
rigorous U.S. disclosure standards that exceed the disclosure standards
under which the issuer thought it was working.151 Nor does Regulation
S clarify the extent of the extraterritorial application of state securities
laws, the "Blue Sky" laws.
Under the Commission's analysis, however, similar statutory lan-
guage is interpreted to provide different bases for and ambits of extrater-
ritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. This variation raises questions of
consistency in our relations with other countries, as well as statutory au-
thorization. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States152 supports this variation, arguing that under its inter-
est-balancing test, the character of the activity to be regulated affects the
reasonableness of the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction: "[t]hus, an in-
terest in punishing fraudulent or manipulative conduct is entitled to
greater weight than are routine administrative requirements." This argu-
ment is acceptable insofar as reasonableness is the touchstone of prescrip-
tive jurisdiction, as it is under the Restatement Third, because the
reasonableness test provides varying weights to different policy interests.
However, this inconsistency of interpretation of identical statutory ex-
pressions of prescriptive jurisdiction indicates a problem with the reason-
ableness analysis from the U.S. domestic perspective: its lack of
statutory support. There is also a substantive problem: the reasonable-
150 Regulation S Release, supra note 148, at 11, 16-17. The Commission cites language in Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975): "It is
elementary that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to many transactions
which are neither within the registration requirements nor on organized American markets."
151 But see MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
the U.S. antifraud rules would not protect a U.S. investor in a foreign offering, where the U.S.
investor evaded the safeguards established by the issuer to avoid offering and selling securities to
U.S. persons).
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416
comment (a) (1987).
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ness analysis can result in varying scopes of prescriptive jurisdiction, de-
pending on the level of interest a particular country has in the conduct in
question. This assumes that the foreign country or countries do not have
a countervailing interest. In this connection, consider the U.S. securities
laws' critical goal of deterring fraud in connection with securities trans-
actions. Even if the relevant foreign country has a similar goal of deter-
ring fraud, it may have a different definition of fraud. The prescriptive
jurisdiction problem arises because the foreign country does not consider
the conduct in question to constitute fraud.'53 Thus the foreign country
may have a countervailing regulatory goal: to avoid having its securities
markets become subject to the additional costs of compliance with U.S.
disclosure standards. In the face of this countervailing interest, it is not
clear why the antifraud provisions should be given broader application
than the registration provisions.
Section 5 of the Securities Act requires all non-exempt offers and
sales of securities using the jurisdictional means of interstate commerce
to be registered with the Commission. The interpretive issue for which
Regulation S provides a response is: what is meant by "interstate com-
merce?"1"4 More specifically, the question might be phrased by the
Commission as what is meant by "interstate commerce" in the context of
the registration provisions of the Securities Act, as we have seen that the
Commission takes the view that different provisions of the securities laws
and of other U.S. financial regulation have different scopes of prescriptive
jurisdiction. Regulation S codifies and elaborates practice under Release
4708 and numerous "no-action" letters interpreting and expanding Re-
lease 4708. These emanations from the Commission attempt to fill the
statutory gap in the Securities Act. They have done so with the goals of
the Commission under the Securities Act in mind: careful and compre-
hensive disclosure regulation of public offerings to U.S. persons or in the
United States. The Commission has also considered "comity" an impor-
tant factor in determining the scope of application abroad of the registra-
tion requirements:
Principles of comity and the reasonable expectations of participants in the
global markets justify reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions outside
the United States to define requirements for transactions effected
offshore. 1
5 5
153 There may be other less substantive reasons, such as that the counterpart country provides a
lesser standard of recovery, or less effective procedures.
154 Section 2(7) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1988), defines "interstate commerce" to
include "trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto
* between any foreign country and any State, Territory or the District of Columbia ......




This is an argument for mutual recognition. This approach to mu-
tual recognition differs from that imposed under European Community
law pursuant to the single market program and specifically under the
Second Banking Directive, insofar as it is based on "soft" law: a discre-
tionary approach to comity and expectations of market participants. In
this sense it is not mandatory for the United States to provide this type of
mutual recognition. However, the Commission, here and in connection
with Rule 15a-6, appears willing to provide limited mutual recognition.
The Commission has recently proposed expanding the concept of
mutual recognition significantly, in connection with tender offers, ex-
change offers and rights issues.' 56 With respect to tender offers and ex-
change offers, these proposals would recognize that it is inappropriate to
apply the full U.S. rules to offers with respect to which only a small
minority of shareholders are U.S. persons. This proposal differs from
Regulation S, which would call for the full application of U.S. registra-
tion requirements in connection with a public offering where only a small
minority of purchasers are U.S. persons.
Regulation S is based on a territorial approach to the application of
the registration requirements: if the offering takes place "in" the United
States, it must be registered. If it does not, it need not. The Commission
will not apply registration requirements to protect U.S. citizens purchas-
ing securities abroad; such protection is unnecessary to carry out the
Commission's principal purpose. 157 The touchstone for prescriptive ju-
risdiction here is where the transaction takes place, more than who the
purchaser is, although who the purchaser is may affect the complex de-
termination of where the transaction takes place. In accepting this prin-
ciple, the Commission accepts the idea that investors who are U.S.
citizens, by acquiring securities outside the United States, may effectively
choose to forego the protections of the registration requirements and
U.S. disclosure requirements. "As investors choose their markets, they
choose the laws and regulations applicable in such markets." 15 This
concept, though undoubtedly accurate at one level, may be inconsistent
with Section 14 of the Securities Act, 5 9 which provides that contractual
waivers of compliance with the Securities Act are void. However, in
156 International Tender and Exchange Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6897, 48 SEC Docket
(CCH) 1646 (June 5, 1991); Cross-Border Rights Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6896, 48 SEC
Docket (CCH) 1617 (June 5, 1991). For a summary of these proposals and their context, see Bartos,
A New Deal for US Investors in Foreign Markets, INT'L FiN. L.R., July 1991, at 27.
157 We will see below that this distinguishes the Commission, and the securities laws, from the
Internal Revenue Service, and the tax laws.
158 Regulation S Release, supra note 148, at 15-16.
159 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988).
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Scherck v. Alberto-Culver,"6 the Supreme Court held that this policy
against waivers (in the context of a similar provision in the Exchange
Act) might give way in the international context to the goal of fostering
certainty in international commerce.
This territorial approach is implemented through a general state-
ment to the effect that offers and sales that take place outside the United
States are not required to be registered under Section 5 of the Securities
Act,16 x and two safe harbors162 to provide mechanisms for issuers to
achieve relative certainty that their offerings are, indeed, outside the
United States. The work that has gone into elaborating this simple stan-
dard shows that merely stating that the principle to follow in resolving
prescriptive jurisdiction problems is territoriality does not definitively re-
solve these problems. This is because territoriality includes several con-
cepts, including degree of territorial conduct, degree of territorial effects
and a comparison to territorial conduct and effects elsewhere.
163
Regulation S begins with a series of preliminary notes, the second of
which expresses the Commission's ambivalence about the delimitation of
regulatory jurisdiction represented by Regulation S:
In view of the objective of these rules and the policies underlying the Act,
Regulation S is not available with respect to any transaction or series of
transactions that, although in technical compliance with these rules, is part
of a plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions of the Act. In such
cases, registration under the Act is required. 164
While the Commission would no doubt protest that this type of pro-
vision, like its analogs in the U.S. tax laws, 165 would not be used much
and is necessary to prevent abuse, a practitioner might respond that this
type of broad regulatory safety valve poses unacceptable risks to the issu-
ers that obviously will plan to avoid (but not evade?) the registration re-
quirements. Like the separation of the registration requirements from
the antifraud requirements, this ambivalence is based on regulo-centrism
160 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974).
161 Regulation S supra note 9, at Rule 901.
162 Regulation S, supra note 9, at Rules 903 and 904. These are non-exclusive safe harbors: com-
pliance with one of the safe harbors allows the issuer not to register, but non-compliance does not
necessarily result in a registration obligation, so long as the requirements of the general statement are
met.
163 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402(1) (1987), elaborating at least three approaches to territoriality, and § 403(2)(a) and
(b), describing a relativist approach to territoriality.
164 Regulation S, supra note 9, at preliminary note 2.
165 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1991), changing the "passage of title" rule for determining
the source of income from sales of inventory, by stating that where "tax avoidance" is involved, all
factors of the transaction will be considered. In the tax case, the ambivalence is between providing
clear rules and trying to avoid providing means for tax avoidance or evasion.
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and an unwillingness definitively to give up the possibility of applying
U.S. regulatory principles to foreign activity.
Section 901, the general statement, has been reduced significantly
from the general statement included in the Regulation S Initial Release
and the Regulation S Reproposing Release, which contained much more
substantive guidance, including a list of factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether an offering is offshore. The general statement as finally
promulgated merely provides that Section 5 of the Securities Act does
not apply to offers and sales of securities that occur outside the United
States. Section 902 provides a series of definitions, and Sections 903 and
904 provide safe harbors under which an offering is deemed to occur
outside the United States.
Section 903 is the safe harbor applicable to sales by issuers of securi-
ties. It significantly liberalizes prior practice in the offshore offering area,
allowing less restricted offerings. It requires first, that the offer and sale
be made in an "offshore transaction;" second, that no "directed selling
efforts" be made in the United States by the issuer or any underwriter or
other distributor; and third, that depending on the perceived risk that
securities offered will flow back to the United States, certain safeguards
be established to cause them to "come to rest" abroad. An "offshore
transaction" is one where the offer to sell is made offshore. In addition,
for purposes of this safe harbor, either the seller must believe the buyer to
be outside the United States, or the transaction must take place through
an established foreign securities exchange.1 66 "Directed selling efforts"
means any activity that could reasonably be expected to stimulate U.S.
interest in the securities. 167 The safeguards required to be established in
order to ensure that the securities come to rest abroad depend on the
type of issuer and the type of security involved. No additional safeguards
are required in the case of securities issued by a foreign issuer for which
there is no substantial U.S. market interest, as defined.168 In addition, no
additional safeguards are required for securities sold in an "overseas di-
rected offering," which is an offering by a foreign issuer in a single for-
eign country, or an offering by a U.S. issuer in a single foreign country of
debt securities denominated in a foreign currency.169 For securities of
issuers required to file annual, quarterly and interim reports under the
Exchange Act, and for debt securities of other issuers, certain offering
restrictions are required, including appropriate legends on the offering
166 Regulation S, supra note 9, at § 902(i).
167 Regulation S, supra note 9, at § 902(b).
168 Regulation S, supra note 9, at § 902(n).
169 Regulation S, supra note 9, at § 902(j).
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documents, and forty-day lock-ups during which the securities may not
be sold to U.S. persons. For other offerings, similar offering restrictions
are required, as well as a forty-day lock-up for debt securities and a one-
year lock-up for equity securities, as well as buyer certifications to the
effect that they are not U.S. persons and other safeguards. 170 U.S. per-
sonality is determined based on residency, rather than citizenship.
Section 904 is the resale transactions safe harbor for transactions by
persons other than the issuer or distributors on behalf of the issuer. It
includes the same requirement for an offshore transaction, and the same
prohibition on directed selling efforts in the United States, as Section 903.
However, it modifies the safeguards required in order to ensure that the
securities come to rest abroad, imposing on dealers in securities during
the lock-up periods applicable under Section 903 the obligation not to
sell to anyone known to be a U.S. person, and only to sell to other dealers
with a notice stating that the securities are subject to the lock-up.
Regulation S has been hailed as an advance in the certainty, econ-
omy and logic of the U.S. regulatory approach to foreign securities offer-
ings. It is indeed a useful exercise in administrative determination of the
extraterritorial scope of the U.S. securities laws. One significant question
about this exercise is what statutory basis the Commission has for delim-
iting the reach of Section 5 of the Securities Act. In a sense, this question
is not a new one, as it is at least as old as Release 4708. As noted above,
the Commission has made some policy choices in promulgating Regula-
tion S, determining that it only applies to certain parts of the securities
laws, and determining the circumstances under which it is available.
The Commission refers to Section 19171 of the Securities Act as au-
thority for Regulation S. Section 19 gives the Commission authority to
make such rules as are necessary to carry out the provisions of the Secur-
ities Act. Regulation S can be evaluated against this authority in two
ways. First, it might be argued that Section 19 provides authority for
Regulation S because there are implicit in Section 5 and in the definition
of interstate commerce limits on the prescriptive jurisdiction meant to be
exercised by Congress.172 For example, the definition of interstate com-
merce, which tracks the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, speaks of
commerce among the several states and with foreign nations, implying
that Congress did not intend to reach commerce that does not involve
170 Regulation S supra note 9, at § 903(c).
171 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1988).
172 See § 2(a)(7) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7). The Commerce Clause of the Consti-
tution has similar language. U.S. CONST. ART. 1, § 8, cl. 3. For an analysis of the constitutional
arguments, see Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and
Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (1987).
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the United States. The question left unanswered by this proposition is
what does it mean to involve the United States in this world of interde-
pendence, arbitrage and fungibility? A plausible argument can be made
that all financial transactions, whether denominated in dollars or not,
affect the U.S. economy, at least indirectly. 173 However, this argument is
unacceptable in the international arena, and thus it is for Congress or the
Commission, or the courts, to further define the magnitude of involve-
ment that will be sufficient to invoke the application of U.S. laws. On
this basis, the Commission may argue that it is necessary for it to make
rules delimiting the jurisdictional reach of Section 5. Second, it might be
argued that it is necessary to delimit the ambit of the registration require-
ments, because it is physically and politically impossible to apply them to
the full range of conduct that the definition of interstate commerce
reaches. 174
B. Regulation S and the TEFRA D Rules: An Example of U.S.
Regulatory Disharmony
As described above, Regulation S was intended to clarify, and to
liberalize, the extent of U.S. securities regulation of offshore offerings.
However, the liberalization actually achieved was less than expected, be-
cause the IRS could not accept the complete liberalization that the Com-
mission was seeking. The IRS, and the tax laws, have different goals and
methods than the Commission and the securities laws. For example,
U.S. citizens are subject to U.S. taxation on their worldwide income (sub-
ject to limited tax credits for certain foreign income taxes), regardless of
the fact that they may be resident abroad, whereas one theme of Regula-
tion S is to protect U.S. markets, rather than necessarily investors who
are U.S. citizens. In particular respects, these goals and methods coin-
cided for a time to make compliance with certain securities law require-
ments suffice to satisfy certain tax law requirements. As the Commission
liberalized in accordance with its regulatory goals, it changed its rules in
a way that ended this coincidence of method. In order to understand this
173 This would be similar to the cumulative effects test applied in domestic interstate commerce
analysis under Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
174 The Commission's authority to make rules is limited by the requirement that the Commission
act in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor capricious, and by the requirement that its rulemaking
not be in excess of statutory authority. It is appropriate to consider the question of whether, in light
of the statutory context, it is arbitrary for the Commission by regulation (as opposed to the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion) to divide the world for purposes of the prescriptive jurisdiction of the
registration requirements on territorial lines, but to continue to purport to apply the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws more broadly.
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issue, it is necessary briefly to review the history of U.S. tax treatment of
eurobond offerings by U.S. issuers.
The U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1984 created a "portfolio interest" ex-
emption from the U.S. 30% withholding tax applicable on interest paid
to foreign creditors. This allowed a significant simplification of proce-
dures for offerings by U.S. issuers in the eurobond market." 5 Under in-
terpretive regulations subsequently issued by the IRS in accordance with
the bearer bond provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA), this portfolio interest exemption was available for
eurobonds in bearer form (as opposed to those that are in registered
form, meaning that they can only be transferred by a notation on the
books of a registrar or transfer agent). However, for bearer bonds, cer-
tain safeguards are required. The IRS views the safeguards as necessary
in connection with offerings by U.S. issuers in order to prevent bearer
bonds from being purchased by U.S. investors as a means of evading
their U.S. tax obligations. Bearer bonds are particularly susceptible to
use to evade taxes, because they may be held anonymously, and the
owner may receive payments of interest and principal without revealing
his or her identity. While this concern may indeed be valid, the restric-
tions placed on offerings by U.S. issuers must be insufficient to accom-
plish its purpose, as the greater integration of capital markets and
fungibility of debt obligations issued by U.S. issuers with those issued by
foreign issuers means that investors should be relatively indifferent be-
tween U.S. bearer bonds and foreign bearer bonds.
The safeguards imposed by TEFRA on bearer bonds of U.S. issuers
were a foreign issuance requirement and a foreign payment of interest
requirement: seeking to ensure that the securities were offered and sold
to non-U.S. persons, and that interest is payable only outside the United
States. 176 Issuers that do not comply with these requirements would be
denied deductions for interest payments on these bonds, and would be
subject to an excise tax. In addition, U.S. holders would be subject to
certain sanctions under U.S. tax laws, including denial of capital gains
175 For the background of these provisions, see Pergam, Legal Dimensions of Eurobond Financ-
ing, 1989 SMU INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1989).
176 IRC § 163(f)(2)(B) requires bearer bonds to comply with the following requirements in order
to avoid certain tax penalties, including denial of deductibility of interest for the issuer:
(i) there are arrangements reasonably designed to ensure that such obligation [an obligation in
bearer form] will be sold (or resold in connection with the original issue) only to a person who is
not a United States person, and
(ii) in the case of an obligation not in registered form-
(1) interest on such obligation is payable only outside the United States and its possessions,
and
(II) on the face of such obligation there is a statement that any United States person who
holds such obligation will be subject to limitations under the United States income tax laws.
International Financial Regulations
12:241(1991)
treatment and denial of loss deductions. The regulations issued under
the Tax Reform Act of 1984 elaborated the foreign issuance requirement
and foreign payment of interest requirement.
177
Under the 1984 regulations, the foreign issuance requirement is met
if the bonds are offered, sold and delivered outside the United States and
either (i) the issuer receives an opinion of counsel that the obligation is
exempt from registration under the Securities Act because it is intended
for distribution only to non-U.S. persons, or (ii) the offering meets a four-
part test. The four-part test involves agreements by the distributors of
the offering that they will not offer or sell to U.S. persons (except finan-
cial institutions under certain circumstances), requirements that the dis-
tributors send confirmations to purchasers requiring the purchasers to
represent that they are not U.S. persons, requirements that the purchas-
ers certify that they are not U.S. persons in order to receive delivery of
definitive bonds, and requirements that the issuer and distributors not
have knowledge of the falsity of such certificate. The foreign payment of
interest requirement is met if interest is payable only on presentation of
an interest coupon outside the United States, and not by transfer to a
U.S. account or by mail to a U.S. address.
Regulation S could have made the first alternative means of satisfy-
ing the foreign issuance requirement easier to meet, insofar as the first
alternative relies on the securities law test. However, the IRS was not
satisfied with Regulation S as a means of satisfying the foreign issuance
requirement, for two reasons. First, Regulation S, in a departure from
previous securities law practice, uses a residence-based definition of U.S.
person, while U.S. tax law concerns mandate a definition that covers
either citizenship or residency.' 7  Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, Regulation S eliminates the need for purchaser certification of
non-U.S. personality for offerings of bearer bonds of U.S. issuers required
to fie annual, quarterly and interim reports under the Exchange Act.
The restrictions imposed on these offerings by Regulation S, as stated
above, include certain offering restrictions, including appropriate legends
on the offering documents, as well as forty-day restricted periods during
which debt securities may not be sold to U.S. persons (based on resi-
dency), but not including certifications as to non-U.S. personality of the
177 T.D. 7965, 49 Fed. Reg. 33228 (1984); T.D. 7966, 49 Fed. Reg. 33236 (1984); T.D. 7967, 49
Fed. Reg. 33239 (Aug. 22, 1984). Amended versions of these regulations have appeared as IRS
Regs. §§ 1.163-5(c)(2)(i)(A) and (B), which have been replaced by the TEFRA D rules described
below, and as Reg. § 1.163-5(c)(2)(i)(C)), which will continue to be available under certain circum-
stances for foreign issuers and foreign branches of U.S. banks.
178 IRC § 7701(30).
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purchaser. Therefore, the IRS adopted independent requirements for
satisfaction of the foreign issuance requirement.
The IRS requirements-known as the TEFRA D rules179-were is-
sued on May 4, 1990, two weeks after Regulation S was promulgated,
and in response to Regulation S. The principal features that distinguish
TEFRA D from prior tax regulation requirements and from Regulation
S with respect to offerings of bearer bonds-the instrument of choice in
the eurobond market-are as follows.
First, TEFRA D requires generally that no offers or sales in the
United States or to U.S. persons be made by the issuer or any distributor
during a forty-day restricted period, and that the bonds be delivered
outside the United States. The definition of "U.S. person" is based on
citizenship or residency. Thus, while Regulation S would permit an of-
fering of eurobonds to be made in a way that would not discriminate
between foreign persons and U.S. persons resident abroad, TEFRA D
would require such discrimination. A distributor-generally, any person
who offers or sells the securities during the 40-day restricted period
under a contract with the issuer or with a person under a contract with
the issuer-is deemed to comply with this restriction if it covenants to do
so, and has in place procedures reasonably designed to let its employees
or agents know of the restrictions.
Second, TEFRA D requires that the issuer obtain a certificate of the
owner of the bond or of a financial institution through which the owner
owns the bond, certifying that the obligation is not owned by a U.S. per-
son, or is owned by an eligible U.S. person or financial institution. Regu-
lation S requires certificates in connection with offerings of debt securities
only for U.S. issuers that are not subject to the reporting requirements of
the Exchange Act. TEFRA D contains an exception to the certification
requirement for offerings targeted to countries where certification is ex-
pected to be impermissible under local law, subject to the satisfaction of a
number of requirements designed to indicate that the offering is targeted
to purchasers in that country. It is expected that certification will be
impermissible under the laws of Germany and Switzerland.
The TEFRA D provisions have clear statutory backing for their re-
striction of offerings to U.S. persons defined by reference to either citi-
zenship or residence. In addition, this approach is consonant with the
jurisdictional approach of U.S. tax law: to tax all citizens and residents.
The statutory basis for the TEFRA D requirement of certification
where Regulation S would not require certification is less clear. The IRS
179 TEFRA D Rules, supra note 10.
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imposed this requirement despite liberalization by the Commission in
Regulation S in a context where their immediate goals are similar: to
require that the offering is reasonably designed (using the language of the
tax law) to ensure that the bonds will not be sold to U.S. persons. How-
ever, the underlying rationale of the securities law rule is to maintain the
protections afforded by the registration requirements (here meaning the
requirement to file a registration statement with the Commission) of the
securities law. The underlying rationale of the tax law rule is to avoid
the possibility that U.S. persons (as defined under the tax law) would use
bearer bonds to evade U.S. taxes. While the Commission is willing to
allow U.S. citizens effectively to waive the protections of the registration
requirements (but not necessarily the protections of the antifraud provi-
sions), it would obviously be inappropriate for the IRS to allow U.S. per-
sons to waive the protections against bearer bonds being used to facilitate
tax evasion. However, the TEFRA D rules significantly diminish the
benefit of Regulation S in the context of eurobond offerings, which gener-
ally require bearer securities.
C. Comparison of the Approach of Regulation S to that of the
Reciprocal Prospectus Initiative and the European
Community Common Prospectus Initiative
In most markets, securities offering regulation is based on disclo-
sure. Multinational offerings of securities have in recent years become
common, and are recognized as an effective way to broaden the market-
ing of securities, also adding stability and depth to the secondary market
for an issuer's securities. However, most countries regulate public offer-
ings, and each country's regulation differs, requiring varying levels and
types of disclosure, and requiring varying types of government review
processes. These variations can impede public offerings in two ways:
first, by requiring varying disclosure documents to be prepared satisfying
the requirements of each jurisdiction in which securities are to be offered,
and second, by requiring varying schedules for offerings in different juris-
dictions. These variations can thus be costly, and can raise unnecessary
uncertainty in particular transactions. Regulation S merely describes
certain circumstances under which an offering will be deemed not to take
place in the United States, and therefore will not be required to comply
with the U.S. disclosure and timing requirements. It does not address
the problem of how to proceed when a public offering is intended to take
place in the United States as well as in one or more other jurisdictions.
The unilateral U.S. initiatives and the European Community initiatives
discussed below seek to address this problem.
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1. Reciprocal Prospectus Initiative
In 1985, the Commission proposed two methods for facilitating
multinational offerings of securities in the United States, Canada and the
United Kingdom. 180 The two methods proposed for comment were: (i)
a reciprocal approach whereby a prospectus accepted in the domicile of
the issuer of securities would be accepted in the other countries, and (ii) a
common prospectus approach, which would entail complete harmoniza-
tion of prospectus requirements, at least for multinational offerings. The
reciprocal approach, like the single banking license of the Second Bank-
ing Directive, calls for a degree of satisfaction with the other country's
requirements-and therefore usually a degree of "essential" harmoniza-
tion-but not for complete harmonization.
The 1985 Multinational Offerings Release summarized some of the
differences in disclosure practices among the United States, Canada and
the United Kingdom. It indicated that there are substantial differences,
based on legal requirements and market practice. The U.S. requirements
are more detailed, and require certain different information. For exam-
ple, U.S. law requires that the issuer depict its business broken down into
its geographic and product business segments. Foreign issuers find this
unattractive, as it requires additional accounting expense and may pro-
vide useful information to competitors. In addition, variations in ac-
counting practice result in different definitions and treatment of certain
accounting items, rendering financial statements prepared under different
accounting systems non-comparable. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tant, the Multinational Offerings Release describes the difference in lia-
bility for omissions and misstatements in connection with offerings. The
main difference here is in the legal system and legal culture, with far
fewer private lawsuits for securities fraud in Canada and the United
Kingdom than in the United States. These differences in disclosure stan-
dards and liability would have to be addressed in order to implement a
common prospectus approach.
This past June, the Commission adopted a proposal for a reciprocal
prospectus approach with Canada.181 It hopes to extend the approach to
other jurisdictions in the future.
180 Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6568, 32 SEC
Docket (CCH) 707 (February 28, 1985) [hereinafter Multinational Offerings Release].
181 Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modification to the Current Registration and Reporting
System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6902, 49 SEC Docket (CCH) 260 (June 21,
1991) [hereinafter MDS Release], amending Release No. 6879, 47 SEC Docket (CCH) 526 (October
16, 1990), which amended Release No. 6841, 44 SEC Docket (CCH) 56 (July 24, 1989). Canada was
chosen as the first partner because of the greater similarity between the U.S. and Canadian disclosure
and liability standards. In addition, as discussed below, the U.K. is involved with another, more
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The Commission refers to this approach as a hybrid between mutual
recognition and harmonization. 1 2 It is a hybrid in the sense that it in-
volves a certain degree of harmonization of requirements, and a general
but incomplete effort toward mutual recognition. Mutual recognition is
qualified by a number of U.S. requirements that are imposed in addition
to the requirement for satisfaction of Canadian requirements. First, fi-
nancial statements of the issuer are generally required to be reconciled to
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles for at least the first two
years, meaning that certain items must be re-calculated in accordance
with U.S. principles. Auditors of the issuer's financial statements for at
least the most recent year would be required to comply with U.S. stan-
dards of independence.
It is noteworthy that this approach covers only registration require-
ments and requirements regarding categories of information to be dis-
closed, not the application of antifraud provisions; Canadian issuers may
generally make their disclosure in accordance with Canadian law, but
will not be exempted from the rigorous U.S. antifraud rules. This dichot-
omy between registration and information requirements on the one hand,
and antifraud provisions on the other, is consistent with the approach
taken in Regulation S, but it raises greater questions in the reciprocal
prospectus context. The dichotomy does not raise the problem that an
issuer would be subject to liability for failing to provide categories of
information that are not called for by the special disclosure requirements
relating to this initiative, as some commenters claimed. The liability pro-
visions of the Securities Act are inapplicable to any act done or omitted
in conformity with the Commission's rules.183 However, the disclosure
requirements under the Securities Act exist at two levels. First, re-
sponses must be provided to the specific items required by the appropri-
ate registration form. An issuer will not be liable for failing to provide
information under a heading that is not called for by the appropriate
form. However, an issuer will be liable for failing to provide information
that is not specifically required, but that is nevertheless material. The
test of materiality is the U.S. test, and the pattern of liabilities and de-
fenses is the U.S. pattern.
Thus, a Canadian issuer is permitted to provide merely the disclo-
sure required by Canadian law, to the extent permitted under the rules
obligatory, exercise in harmonizing public offering regulation, in connection with the European
Community's single market program.
182 As noted above, this hybrid approach is the main theme of the European Community's 1992
initiative, and is the approach of the Second Banking Directive and other single market financial
regulation initiatives.
183 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1988).
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issued under the MDS Release, but is still subject to potential liability for
failing to state information, or for misstating information, deemed ma-
terial under U.S. law, and is subject, along with its underwriters, to U.S.
standards of liability. As a practical matter, Canadian issuers and their
underwriters will seek to structure their disclosure to be as protective as
possible under U.S. law. The underwriters will therefore engage in U.S.-
style due diligence in order to establish this defense, and they will insist
on a level of disclosure consistent with U.S. materiality standards. Be-
cause of this effect, the concept expressed in the MDS Release will pro-
vide only limited, but important benefits. The benefits that it will
provide, for Canadian issuers offering in the United States and for U.S.
issuers offering in Canada, are not so much in disclosure concessions, but
in timing. The timing advantage is that a simultaneous U.S. and Cana-
dian offering by a Canadian issuer can proceed in accordance with the.
Canadian timing for registration and subsequent permitted sale, instead
of waiting for an independent declaration of effectiveness-the point at
which securities can be sold-in the United States.
It is also important to consider the process that the Commission
followed in negotiating this approach with its Canadian counterparts.
The MDS Release does not evidence significant regulatory compromise
on the part of the Commission. While the Commission has done an ear-
nest job of compromising certain procedural requirements, including
possibilities for Commission review of disclosure, the MDS Release evi-
dences a careful review of foreign regulation to determine whether it sat-
isfies all of the concerns of U.S. regulation, and to supplement the foreign
regulation with additional U.S. requirements where appropriate. This
approach is similar to that seen in connection with the Broker-Dealer
Concept Release. The principle of reciprocity is followed only to the
extent that the foreign jurisdiction-Canada-has rules that satisfy the
Commission's regulatory goals. Otherwise, a principle of harmonization,
or more accurately, of dual regulation, is followed.
2. European Community Prospectus Directive and
Listing Particulars Directive
The European Community has two main directives that deal with
prospectus disclosure and filing requirements in connection with public
offerings. In 1980, the Council of the European Communities adopted
the Listing Particulars Directive184 to harmonize disclosure requirements
184 Council Directive of 17 March 1980 Coordinating the Requirements for the Drawing Up, Scru-
tiny and Distribution of the Listing Particulars to be Published for the Admission of Securities to
Official Stock Exchange Listing, 23 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 100) 1 (1980) (Council Directive 80/
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in connection with listings on securities exchanges within the Commu-
nity. This was followed in 1987 with the Mutual Recognition Direc-
tive, 8 5 which amended the Listing Particulars Directive to add a limited
concept of mutual recognition within the Community. This approach
was extended in 1989 with the Public Offer Directive,"8 6 which extended
the harmonization to public offerings made other than on an exchange.
The Listing Particulars Directive, as amended by the Mutual Rec-
ognition Directive, requires member states to ensure that listings on
stock exchanges within their territories are conditional on the publication
of listing particulars, or an information sheet.117 The information pub-
lished is required to include certain prescribed items of information, with
variations in cases of particular issuers or special offering situations, as
well as any other information necessary for investors to make an in-
formed assessment of the issuer and its securities.18 8 Member states are
required to appoint a competent authority to approve listing particulars
as in conformity with the requirements of the directive before they may
be published. 1 9 The Listing Particulars Directive, prior to amendment
by the Mutual Recognition Directive, merely required relevant compe-
tent authorities in connection with simultaneous or near simultaneous
offerings on multiple Community exchanges to use their best efforts to
coordinate requirements. Thus it made the first step of essential harmo-
nization, but did not take the second step of mandatory mutual recogni-
tion of home state regulation. 90
In 1987, the Listing Particulars Directive was amended by the Mu-
390/EEC) [hereinafter Listing Particulars Directive]. For a detailed description of the Listing Partic-
ulars Directive and the Public Offer Directive referenced below, see Warren, Regulatory Harmony in
the European Communities: The Common Market Prospectus, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 19 (1990).
185 Council Directive of22 June 1987Amending Directive 80/390/EEC Coordinating the Require-
ments for the Drawing-up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Listing Particulars to be Published for the
Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing (Directive No. 87/345), 30 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 185) 81 (1987) (Council Directive 87/345/EEC) [hereinafter Mutual Recognition
Directive]. The Mutual Recognition Directive has been supplemented by Directive 90/21 1/EEC,
Council Directive of 23 April 1990 Amending Directive 80/390/EEC in Respect of the Mutual Recog-
nition of Public-Offer Prospectuses as Stock Exchange Listing Particulars, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 112) 24 (1990) (allowing for the recognition of a public offering prospectus not only as a public
offering prospectus in other member states, but also as listing particulars where admission to listing
is requested within a short period of time).
186 Council Directive of 17 April 1989 Coordinating the Requirements for the Drawing-Up, Scru-
tiny and Distribution of the Prospectus to be Published When Transferable Securities are Offered to
the Public, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 124) 8 (1989) (Council Directive 89/298/EEC) [hereinafter
Public Offer Directive].
187 Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 184, at art. 3.
188 Id. at arts. 4, 5.
189 Id. at art. 18.
190 Id. at art. 24.
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tual Recognition Directive to establish requirements for mutual recogni-
tion of home state regulation within the Community. The home state
regulation is that of the state where the issuer has its registered office, or
if it has none in the Community, where the issuer chooses.191 Once ap-
proved by the home state, the listing particulars are required to be ac-
cepted by the other member states without the separate approval of their
competent authorities.192 Local competent authorities may, however, re-
quire that the listing particulars used in another member state include
information specific to the market of such state concerning income tax,
local paying agents and local publication of notices. 193
The Mutual Recognition Directive predated the reciprocity debate
that took place with respect to the Second Banking Directive, 94 and
therefore does not contain specific provisions regarding the conditions for
availability of the benefits of mutual recognition to issuers resident in
third states. It permits member states to restrict the application of mu-
tual recognition to issuers having their registered office in a member
state. It does, however, provide that the Community may enter into
agreements with third states reciprocally extending the benefits of mutual
recognition to their issuers, provided that the third states' rules provide
"equivalent protection to that afforded by this Directive, even if those
rules differ from the provisions of this Directive."'195 The Public Offer
Directive discussed below has similar provisions.
196
The 1989 Public Offer Directive is intended to extend similar treat-
ment in circumstances where a public offering is made but stock ex-
change listings are not effected. The implementation of this directive
required intense negotiation, as previously Community law did not re-
quire specified disclosure prior to a public offering, but only prior to a
listing on an exchange.
The Public Offer Directive requires prospectuses to be published for
all public offerings within the Community.'97 For public offerings of se-
curities that are to be listed on an exchange, the contents of the prospec-
tus must comply with the Listing Particulars Directive.'98 It is notable
that the Public Offer Directive adopts the regulatory principle that less
detailed information should be required in connection with unlisted offer-
191 Mutual Recognition Directive, supra note 185, at art. 1.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 See text accompanying notes 69-95, supra.
195 Mutual Recognition Directive, supra note 185, at art. 1.
196 Public Offer Directive, supra note 186, at art. 24.
197 Id. at art. 4.
198 Id. at art. 7.
International Financial Regulations
12:241(1991)
ings than in connection with listings, so as not to burden small and me-
dium-sized issuers unduly. 199 While U.S. securities laws have similar
approaches to very small offerings,2 '0 the general thrust of disclosure reg-
ulation in the United States requires less information of larger, more es-
tablished issuers, or at least permits greater incorporation by reference to
periodic disclosure documents, requiring smaller, less established issuers
to provide the fullest disclosure.
The Public Offer Directive requires unlisted offerings to comply
with a less demanding disclosure list than the Listing Particulars Direc-
tive, although it also requires that all information be provided necessary
to enable investors to make an informed decision.201 While prior scru-
tiny of prospectuses is not required for unlisted offerings within a partic-
ular member state, as it is under the Listing Particulars Directive for
2021ilisted securities, prior scrutiny is a condition for mutual recognition
under the Public Offer Directive.20 3 In connection with a simultaneous
or nearly simultaneous offering in two or more member states, the com-
petent authority of the member state in which the issuer has its registered
office, if the public offering or a listing is made in that state, is charged
with scrutinizing and approving the prospectus. One problem raised in
connection with the Public Offer Directive is that some member states do
not generally provide for prior scrutiny of prospectuses. The directive
resolves this problem by providing that in the event that such a state
would otherwise be charged with scrutinizing and approving the prospec-
tus, the offeror must choose another state's competent authority where
such prior scrutiny is normally effected. Subject to this condition and to
translation, a prospectus must be accepted in other member states.
One significant problem with the Public Offer Directive is the scope
of its exclusions, which are so extensive as to possibly obviate the utility
of the directive.2 04
199 Id. at preamble paragraph 12, arts. 7, 11.
200 See Rules 505 (exemption for limited offerings not exceeding $5,000,000) and 504 (exemption
for small issues not exceeding $500,000), which provide exemptions from the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.505. Rule 505 imposes no specific disclosure
requirements, although it does not provide exemptions from the antifraud provisions. See also Regu-
lation A under the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.260.
201 Public Offer Directive, supra note 186, at art. 11.
202 Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 184, at art. 18.
203 Public Offer Directive, supra note 186, at arts. 20, 21.
204 See Warren, supra note 184, at 38-40 for an explanation of these exemptions. Excepted are
eurobonds and euroequities, private placements, small offerings, certain wholesale offerings, em-
ployee offerings and exchange offers.
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3. Regulation S, the Reciprocal Prospectus Initiative and the European
Community Prospectus Initiatives
As noted above, Regulation S is a U.S. administrative effort to di-
vide up global prescriptive jurisdiction for purposes of the procedural
registration requirements of the U.S. securities laws. It determines uni-
laterally under what circumstances these U.S. laws will apply to foreign
securities offerings, and under what circumstances they will not. From
the standpoint of addressing the problems raised by the contradiction
between national regulation and transnational finance, it takes a rela-
tively insular and introspective approach. On the other hand, instead of
addressing these problems by unilaterally determining which state's laws
shall govern, the Reciprocal Prospectus Initiative and the European
Community initiatives bilaterally or regionally seek to adopt mutual rec-
ognition, relying on a degree of harmonization of rules: essential harmo-
nization, with differing standards as to what is essential. The Reciprocal
Prospectus Initiative implements limited mutual recognition, based on
limited harmony of legal standards. The Listing Particulars Directive
and the Public Offer Directive, on the other hand, take a more complete
approach, providing for complete harmonization, at least in selected ar-
eas, and for complete mutual recognition.
These approaches are based on a relatively high degree of agreement
on regulatory purposes: requirements for adequate disclosure to support
accurate investment and capital allocation, combined with some level of
government scrutiny of disclosure practices and liability for faulty disclo-
sure. While public offering regulation contains a risk of regulatory arbi-
trage and consequent competition in regulatory laxity, the direction of
flow is not as clearly indicated as perhaps in areas such as financial insti-
tution powers or capital.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has considered several recent developments in financial
regulation. This consideration has focused on the difficult issues relating
to the sometimes countervailing substantive concerns for regulatory ef-
fectiveness and for competitiveness in international business, as well as
the procedural concerns relating to cooperation, consistency and proper
authorization.
The unilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives described in this
article all seek to address the mismatch between transnational finance




First, as issues of regulatory scope, in which an earnest regula-
tor seeks only to fulfill his or her regulatory mandate, without
other concerns for issues of competitiveness or cooperation;
Second, as issues of trade in services, in which regulators must
be sensitive to the trade concerns of domestic and foreign con-
stituents; and
Third, as issues of economic integration, wherein the principle
of subsidiarity-of regulation at appropriate levels-and of
competition and cooperation in regulation, as well as of the de-
gree to which regulation must mesh with a particular society,
are played out.
Only by considering all three of these perspectives, and by ensuring that
the process used to address international financial regulation issues al-
lows for negotiation taking into account all three of these perspectives,
will it be possible to develop solutions to problems of international finan-
cial regulation.
From a purely legal standpoint, this problem can be described as
one of regulatory scope or prescriptive jurisdiction: which country's law
should govern a particular institution or transaction? However, even if
this legal issue could be resolved, the results would not necessarily make
sense, as a multiplicity of independent regulatory regimes could be an
inefficient means of social control over increasingly transnational finance.
Global homogeneity of regulation is not necessarily optimal either, as
finance regulation must mesh with each society's particular circum-
stances, and as opportunities for variation, and thus for greater innova-
tion and competition, in finance regulation are desirable. The initiatives
described herein illustrate a variety of procedural approaches to this
problem, and a variety of policy considerations applied. These proce-
dural approaches and policy considerations interact in complex ways in
each case.
The policy considerations added to domestic policy discourse in the
context of international regulation include, as noted at the beginning of
this article, the substantive considerations of competitiveness and regula-
tory effectiveness, as well as the more procedural factors of cooperation
and consistency in relations with other countries. These policy consider-
ations influence and interface with the procedural approach adopted.
A. Competitiveness
We have seen that competitiveness has played a significant role in
the formulation of Regulation K, which appears to limit the foreign oper-
ations of foreign banks operating in the United States in order to avoid
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providing better than national treatment in a way that reduces the do-
mestic competitiveness of U.S. banks. Regulation K also provides ex-
panded powers to U.S. banking organizations in their foreign operations
in a way that belies the need for powers limitation domestically, due to
competitive pressures abroad. Regulation K can be viewed as a means to
apply U.S. regulatory hindrances, to some extent, to foreign banking or-
ganizations in their foreign operations, using as a jurisdictional basis the
fact that the foreign banking organization does business in the United
States. Thus, Regulation K fights a rearguard action against more liberal
foreign regulation.
On the other hand, the Second Banking Directive, in its operation
within the European Community, is intended to harness the liberalism of
foreign regulation as a competitive discipline on local member state regu-
lation. Under this aspect of the Second Banking Directive, regulatory
effectiveness is a determining factor of international financial regulation
policy only insofar as the regulatory goal sought to be achieved has been
the subject of essential harmonization; otherwise, free competition is the
determining factor. Regulation cannot otherwise be used intentionally or
unintentionally as a barrier or hurdle to foreign trade in financial serv-
ices. Regulation K is a unilateral dictate that does little to recognize the
possible merits of foreign regulation, whereas the Second Banking Direc-
tive provides a regional process or forum for dialog and competition in
regulation.
The Riegle-Garn Bill differs from both Regulation K and the Sec-
ond Banking Directive in that it explicitly is a trade measure, with no
independent regulatory role. It seeks reciprocity, based on an economic
perspective that openness by the United States is a detriment only to be
accepted in exchange for openness by the relevant trading partner. Of
course, while this type of measure may help to open foreign markets, it
(like the reciprocity provisions of the Second Banking Directive) is also
open to misuse to close domestic markets. The Riegle-Garn Bill rejects
multilateralism (as through the GATT) as the appropriate approach to
opening foreign markets.
On the other hand, Rule 15a-6 and Regulation S appear devoid of
trade motivation: the Commission appears as earnest regulator, merely
trying to protect the integrity of the U.S. capital allocation mechanism.
However, by attaching significant U.S. legal consequences to what may
be relatively insignificant U.S. contacts, without adjustment, they place
burdens on international finance. Rule 15a-6 appears more problematic
in this regard, as it relates to institutional-broker-dealer-regulation, as
opposed to Regulation S, which relates to transactional regulation. On
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the basis of a single U.S. relationship, a foreign broker-dealer could be
required to comply with the full panoply of U.S. broker-dealer regula-
tion. The Commission has shown an interest in moving away from this
type of result in its recent proposals relating to tender offers and rights
offers, but has not been under similar pressure to relinquish jurisdiction
in other areas. The Commission has been motivated by a broad trade
consideration: enhancing the competitiveness of the U.S. economy as a
whole, and of U.S. investors in particular, by providing greater access to
outside sources and uses of finance without prejudicing capital import
neutrality by imposing U.S. regulatory costs on transactions that are es-
sentially foreign.
B. Regulatory Effectiveness
Regulatory effectiveness is linked with competitiveness. It appears
that the ability to maintain and apply regulation that is in excess of the
regulation of other countries, which may be viewed as a category of regu-
latory effectiveness, is increasingly sacrificed to achieve greater competi-
tiveness and greater cooperation with other countries. This makes sense,
but also raises some concerns. The concerns are for the diminished abil-
ity to achieve the appropriate social goals of regulation, whatever they
may be.
One way in which the ability to achieve the goals of regulation is
diminished is through regulatory arbitrage, the shifting of assets or oper-
ations in a manner designed to minimize the costs or effects of regulation.
Regulatory arbitrage is self-conscious structuring of assets or operations.
But even without self-conscious structuring, the increasing international-
ization of business makes it harder for a single regulator to apply its rules
in a way that is effective to achieve the relevant goals, or to supervise and
enforce compliance with its rules. The BCCI scandal has been cited as
an instance of failure to coordinate supervision effectively in the face of
self-conscious structuring to avoid supervision. One prong of the QFBO
test contained in Regulation K, and part of the test for mutual recogni-
tion under the Broker-Dealer Concept Release, seeks to ensure that local
persons are not using a foreign vehicle to shop for a less costly regulator.
The Second Banking Directive contains this concept as well.
Of course, not all regulation is good; some was not accurately for-
mulated when made, some is outdated and some seeks to achieve goals
that may not be appropriate, such as subsidization of a particular busi-
ness. Unless an explicit or implicit dialog with foreign regulators is
maintained, the discipline and ideas that can help reform domestic regu-
lation will not be available. Thus, the negotiations toward cooperation
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can help each regulator to re-examine its own approach in light of the
experience of others. In this sense, cooperation both facilitates and re-
quires the compromise of idiosyncratic regulatory principles.
Even if all regulation were good, it is important to recognize that
overlaps of regulation--double regulation-may impose excessive costs
on enterprise. Yet until clear conflict of law rules for regulators are for-
mulated, as the European Community and the Basle Committee have
sought to do, these costs cannot be eliminated. The willingness of the
United States to project its regulation abroad to cover the foreign activi-
ties of its persons or persons who have other links to the United States
diminishes the ability of other countries to provide capital import neu-
trality in their regulation. The failure of international law, of the U.S.
Constitution and of many statutes to provide clear conflict of law rules
for regulators results in these overlaps.
C. Consistency
The failure of law to provide clear conflict of law rules for regula-
tors, and the failure of U.S. regulators to coordinate more completely to
present an integrated view of the scope of U.S. regulatory jurisdiction,
results in possibilities for confusion and opportunism. This coordination
is enhanced by coordination between the Basle Committee and
IOSCO.205
Regulation K applies U.S. bank regulation to overseas operations of
U.S. banking organizations on the basis of U.S. nationality or U.S. na-
tionality of shareholders, and applies U.S. bank regulation to overseas
operations of foreign banking organizations on the basis of U.S. opera-
tions. Obviously, this approach results in overlap. Rule 15a-6 purports
to apply U.S. broker-dealer regulation to an entire foreign broker-dealer
organization, despite only a small amount of U.S. business. The overlaps
seem more problematic in the area of institutional regulation than in the
area of transactional regulation, such as the registration requirements
under the Securities Act.
Regulation S would apply the U.S. registration requirements to a
public offering where only a small portion of the shares are publicly of-
fered in the United States; this approach also will result in overlapping
public offering regulation. In addition, while Regulation S clarifies the
conflict of law rules with respect to the registration requirements, it de-
clines to provide any guidance as to the applicability of the antifraud
205 See, e.g., Thomson's Int'l Banking Regulator, Sept. 27, 1991, at 1 (reporting coordination
between IOSCO and the Basle Committee on capital requirements for securities operations of banks
and brokerage houses, as they relate to foreign exchange exposure).
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provisions of the securities laws. The Reciprocal Prospectus Initiative
has a similar shortcoming.
In addition, a deeply held principle of U.S. tax jurisdiction is that
U.S. citizens should be subject to taxation on their worldwide income,
regardless of foreign residence. This principle was inconsistent with the
focus of Regulation S on the residence, rather than the citizenship, of
purchasers of securities. The maintenance of this principle has reduced
the utility of Regulation S as a means to provide unilateral conflict of law
rules with respect to the registration requirements under the Securities
Act and thereby enhance capital market efficiency, because the TEFRA
D tax requirements call for more extensive and burdensome procedures.
D. Cooperation
The procedural approaches to cooperation are determined by the
context in which the cooperation is developed: (i) unilateral without rec-
iprocity requirements, such as Regulation K, Rule 15a-6 or Regulation S;
(ii) unilateral with reciprocity requirements, such as the externally-ori-
ented features of the Second Banking Directive or the features proposed
to be added- to U.S. law by the Riegle-Garn Bill; (iii) bilateral reciprocal
agreements, such as the U.S.-Canadian multijurisdictional disclosure sys-
tem; (iv) regional with the constitutional and institutional infrastructure
of the European Community, with no conditions or opportunities for de-
fection based on reciprocity; and (v) multilateral non-binding, loosely re-
ciprocal agreements in the Group of Ten or in IOSCO. The GATT
services negotiations constitute another forum. Additional variations are
of course possible.
As indicated above, cooperation with foreign regulators requires a
recognition of the mutability of domestic regulation: a denial of regulo-
centrism. It also opens up the contingency of domestic regulation, and
allows its re-examination in light of foreign experience.
The underlying difficulty in this exercise is in identifying the appro-
priate social goals of regulation. Those goals that are easier to universal-
ize, such as disclosure regulation in the securities field, or capital
regulation in banking, may be the basis for cooperation that can alleviate
concerns for regulatory effectiveness by maintaining agreed standards, or
by providing for assistance in surveillance and enforcement. In order to
achieve cooperation, it is necessary to resolve regulation, not to its lowest
common denominator, but to its most efficient commonly acceptable
level. However, efficiency is determined by reference to the ability of
regulation to achieve social goals, and each country will have differing
social goals, depending on a variety of factors. On the other hand, some
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types of goals are universal, and some types of institutional or legal
means of achieving those goals are more efficient than others. The insti-
tutional and constitutional infrastructure of the European Community,
and its common goals of integration, provide impetus for accelerated
universalization within the Community, which in turn enhances the abil-
ity to cooperate internally. This institutional and constitutional infra-
structure includes the ability to legislate and adjudicate member state
defections from the principles of free movement of capital and free trade
in services. It may be compared with the soft legislation and non-existent
adjudication capacities of the Group of Ten and of IOSCO, and with the
weak legislative and adjudicative capacities of GATT.
The mode and potential success of cooperation will depend on fac-
tors such as the degree of universality of goals, the severability of the area
of regulation from other aspects of social structure, the type of regulation
involved, perceptions as to its importance for sovereignty and importance
for local control, and the institutional and constitutional infrastructure
for cooperation.
Finally, as enhanced cooperation requires the compromise and reso-
lution of domestic regulatory goals and methods, it is necessary that co-
operation be effected at the level of authority competent to do so.
Neither the Commission nor the Board has been delegated full compe-
tence to do so, nor should they be. Rather, they should cooperate with
other administrative organs to propose treaty or legislative solutions. It
is for Congress to determine how our policies should be compromised in
order to integrate our economy with the international system.
Finance is central to enterprise. As more countries move to free
their enterprise, they must also free their finance. The free transnational
flow of finance, and thus of enterprise, will help to spread jobs and
wealth, as well as to increase aggregate wealth. This phenomenon can be
facilitated by a dove-tailed effort to diminish regulatory barriers to the
free flow of capital and to enhance the accuracy of the allocation of capi-
tal through efficient regulation.
